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The theory of planned behavior model was used to investigate business 
managers’ responses to two ethical dilemmas in organizations: the use of electronic 
monitoring and retrenchment.  
The results show that attitude and subjective norms both contributed unique 
variance to explaining behavioral intentions. The more negative the attitudes toward 
use of electronic monitoring or retrenching the employees, the weaker the intentions to 
execute the decisions. The lower the perceived social pressures to use electronic 
monitoring or retrench employees, the weaker the intentions to do so. The results also 
suggest that respondents were more inclined to retrench employees when instructed to 
do so by a legitimate authority. Potential contributions and implications of the 
findings are discussed. 
 




We all make decisions daily. The decisions involved could range from a choice 
of venue for a business lunch, to a serious evaluation of a major business opportunity. 
The options get more complicated when imperative but intangible factors, such as 
ethics, get into the picture. With the recent scandals associated with Enron and Arthur 
Anderson, ethics has become a buzzword in both academia and business. The 
revelations of corporate wrongdoings and unethical conduct have quickly eroded trust 
and squandered goodwill between corporations and their stakeholders in America and 
other countries. Since ethical lapses exact such a high price, it is important to 
understand how people respond to moral dilemmas and what factors influence their 
responses. 
Theoretical frameworks and empirical studies have focused on examining the 
cognitive processes underlying the decision makers’ behavior and the role of 
dispositional, situational, social or organizational factors as determinants of the moral 
agent’s moral judgment and behavior (Frey, 2000; Cole, Sirgy & Bird, 2000; Ford & 
Richardson, 1994; Jones, 1991; Trevino, 1986; Rest, 1986; Ferrell & Gresham, 1985). 
Despite these attempts to explain or predict decision makers’ ethical behavioral 
outcomes, most of the models have seldom or never been validated empirically 
(Chang, 1998). Some models are restricted to examining ethical decision making by 
specific groups e.g. marketing professionals (Ferrell & Gresham, 1985), while others 
have a narrow emphasis on moral beliefs, which may not offer an adequate 
explanation of the antecedents that predict a person’s behavioral intentions (Hunt & 
Vitell, 1993). While normative ethical theories show that decision makers follow 
particular ethical orientations in making decisions, the theories do not explain or 
predict why they do so (Trevino, 1986). Two reasons were suggested: Normative 




ethical theories idealize the decision making process and may not reflect real world 
constraints, and philosophical or normative theories lack face validity because most 
people probably do not refer to them for decision making. This is not a criticism of 
normative theory. Normative theories are by their very nature not meant to be 
descriptive. 
Our research model applied part of the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 
1991) to explain and predict a person’s response to ethical dilemmas in organizational 
contexts. Specifically, we tested the influence of attitude, subjective norms, and 
perceived behavioral control components on behavioral intentions. We did not 
measure the actual behavioral component as the behaviors under investigation were 
sensitive and not easily observable in everyday life. We were inspired to integrate 
some of the variables from the theory of planned behavior into our model because it is 
an established and well-tested theory with proven validity. Empirically, the theory has 
demonstrated its usefulness in predicting and explaining a wide variety of behavior 
across situations (Ajzen, 2001; Armitage & Conner, 2001; Sheeran & Orbell, 1999; 
Sutton, 1998; Conner & Armitage, 1998). It provides a relatively parsimonious 
framework for explaining and predicting intentions and behavior (Sheeran & Orbell, 
1999; Perugini & Bagozzi, 2001). Various studies have provided evidence of the 
suitability of this model in research on ethical decision making (Cordano & Frieze, 
2000; Flannery & May, 2000; Chang, 1998; Kurland, 1996; Randall & Gibson, 1991). 








1.1 Research Aims and Motivation  
This study has three main objectives. We aimed to examine the usefulness of 
the predictors of the theory of planned behavior (one’s attitudes, subjective norms and 
perceived control), in explaining and predicting intentions in organizational ethical 
dilemmas in an Asian context. We also wish to examine whether the incorporation of 
self-efficacy, and perceived worth of effort into our model influence intentions. Third, 
we would like to determine whether accountability pressures and presence of 
legitimate authority’s directive interact with the predictors in our model to influence 
behavioral intentions  
 
1.1.1 The Influence of Attitude, Subjective Norms and Perceived Behavioral 
Control on Intentions to Retrench Employees and Use Electronic 
Monitoring in an Asian Context 
The predictors in the theory of planned behavior have been used to predict or 
explain personal or social behaviors such as body weight regulation (Perugini & 
Bagozzi, 2001), Ecstasy usage (Orbell, Blair, Sherlock & Conner, 2001), exercising 
(Sheeran & Orbell, 2000; Terry & O’Leary, 1995), attendance for breast cancer 
screening (Rutter, 2000), gays’ safer sex behavior (Boldero, Sanitioso & Brain, 1999), 
lottery playing (Sheeran & Orbell, 1999), pro-environmental behavior (Harland, Statts 
& Wilke, 1999), academic achievement (Manstead & van Eekelen, 1998), illegal 
copying of software (Chang, 1998), food consumption (Sparks, Guthrie & Shepard, 
1997), waste management behavior (Taylor & Todd, 1997), volunteer intentions 
(Harrison, 1995), intentions to enroll in ethics course (Randall, 1994), and investment 
decisions (East, 1993).  




Despite their proven usefulness, the predictors in the theory of planned 
behavior have seldom been applied to organizational research. In recent years, the 
model has been applied to a few studies in organizational research, such as 
environmental ethical decision making (Flannery & May, 2000), managers’ behavioral 
preferences for pollution reduction activity (Cordano & Frieze, 2000), intentions to do 
competitive benchmarking (Hill, Mann & Wearing, 1996), and nurses’ intentions to 
report colleagues’ inadequate patient care or mistakes (Randall & Gibson, 1991). 
Given that few studies applied the predictors in organizational research, it is of 
empirical importance to test the usefulness of attitude, subjective norms and perceived 
control in new organizational domains. We chose to examine the usefulness of these 
variables in explaining and predicting behavioral intentions in two untested 
organizational decision contexts: the use of electronic monitoring and retrenchment of 
employees. Few studies have tested the predictors in Asian contexts or on managers 
from a wide range of industries. This study seeks to fill these gaps by testing our 
model on managers from more than 15 industries in an Asian country.  
 
1.1.2 The Role of Self-efficacy and Perceived Worth of Effort 
The theory of planned behavior model can account for between 40 and 50 
percent variance in behavioral intentions (Sheeran & Orbell, 1999; Sutton, 1998). 
Various researchers have questioned its sufficiency as an explanatory and predictive 
model for decision making. Some suggested augmenting the model to account for the 
unexplained variance in behavioral outcomes. Besides incorporating the predictors 
from the theory of planned behavior into our model, this study also included and 
examined two other predictors of behavioral intentions in ethical decisions: self-




efficacy and perceived worth of effort. 
Self-efficacy refers to “judgments of how well one can execute courses of 
action required to deal with prospective situations” (Bandura, 1982: 122). Flannery 
and May (2000) tested the role of self-efficacy in their study on environmental 
decision making but it did not contribute unique variance to intentions. They urged 
researchers to verify the results of their study in a different context. Hence, this study 
also serves to confirm or counter Flannery and May’s findings on the role of self-
efficacy in the theory of planned behavior. 
Perceived worth of efforts is the “amount of energy, time and resources the 
decision maker believes he or she has to invest in a behavior” (adapted from Mohr & 
Bitner, 1995: 243). In evaluating options, decision makers are influenced by a host of 
personal and social considerations. A simple heuristic frequently used to evaluate 
options is the cost-benefit analysis. People are likely to use the cost-benefit method to 
assess situations and evaluate whether their efforts are worth investing in performing a 
behavior. The process may not involve actual budgeting or calculating the time 
devoted to the activities. It could merely be a mental estimation of whether the 
expected returns are worth the efforts expended or the resources invested in 
performing a behavior.  
To our knowledge, this study is the first test of the role of perceived worth of 
effort in explaining intentions. We hope to identify specific variables that influence 








1.1.3 The Role of Moderators: Accountability Pressures and Presence of 
Authority’s Directive  
Researchers have examined the role of individual differences as either 
moderators or predictors of intentions in the theory of planned behavior (e.g. Perugini 
& Bagozzi, 2001; Sparks & Guthrie, 1998; Miller & Grush, 1986).  Fewer studies 
considered and integrated important organizational characteristics such as the need to 
justify decisions to others and pressures from higher authorities within the research 
framework. This study proposes that social influences also have the potential to 
interact with one’s attitudes, perceived social pressures and perceived behavioral 
control, which in turn determine one’s responses toward moral dilemmas. Specifically, 
we would like to examine whether accountability pressures and presence of directives 
from legitimate authorities interact with the predictors of the theory of planned 
behavior or influence intentions directly, so that organizations may then focus on these 
tactics to influence employees’ behavior in the face of moral dilemmas.  
 
Accountability Pressures 
 Accountability pressures influence what people think and how they think 
(Tetlock, Skitka & Boettger, 1989). In the organizational setting, managers need to be 
accountable to multiple stakeholders. As employees, they need to contribute and 
perform well in their respective job functions. As superiors, they need to guide or 
mentor their subordinates and ensure fair distribution of workload and rewards. 
Managers face daily tensions in their struggles to meet the various stakeholders’ 
expectations, who may have conflicting interests. Inevitably, certain decisions that 
involve multiple parties are likely to result in negative consequences for some groups. 




In such situations, managers’ integrity, conduct, skills, or intentions could be 
negatively judged by their colleagues. 
According to Cremer, Snyder and DeWitte (2000), it is important to 
investigate the influence of accountability pressures on the decision making process 
because it is a “pervasive aspect of social life” (p. 95). Laboratory-based studies 
typically examine the underlying psychological processes in decision making in 
contexts where actors need not consider the consequences of their decisions (Tetlock, 
1985). While these studies have yielded useful insights on the way people process and 
analyze information, they underplayed situation specific factors or social forces that 
influence decision maker’s judgment and choices in dynamic settings.  In reality 
however, people usually have to be accountable for their actions or decisions (Tetlock, 
1992). People who fail to provide acceptable explanations for their behavior or 
decisions may subject themselves to different extent of reproach (Tetlock, 1985). 
Hence, the accountability pressures involved in the decision making process should be 
considered in research.  
Second, justification or accountability pressure is a characteristic of decision                        
tasks (Huber & Seiser, 2001). In general, research suggests that characteristics of the 
decision task such as framing effects, the stimulus contexts and the response modes 
influence choices (Mellers, 1998). One specific task characteristic -  the sequence in 
which information or an option is presented and reviewed – has been shown to 
influence the decision maker’s preferences for the available options (Moore, 1999). 
Examining the effect of accountability pressures is part of an essential process in 
understanding the role of task characteristics on outcomes (Huber & Seiser, 2001: 71).  
Accountability pressures amplify the social costs of letting down the person or 




group whom one is accountable to. The risks of being evaluated as callous, 
incompetent or immoral by the audience are factors that are likely to influence 
managers to engage in more complex or cognitively demanding thinking process for 
decisions that will have harmful effects on others. The need to justify or explain one’s 
decision to an audience discourage people from making decisions that benefit the 
more powerful stakeholders at the expense of those with weaker bargaining powers 
(e.g. junior employees).  
In a retrenchment context, laying off staff creates a host of negative attitudes 
and emotions such as resentment, anger, feelings of unfairness, betrayal and low 
morale. Managers tend to make choices that will benefit the group they are 
accountable to. While managers also need to be accountable to the organizations they 
work for, we expect them to respond to the group that is more salient. In addition, 
organizational actors may perceive their institutions or organizations as faceless 
entities rather than groups.  
 
Obedience to Authority 
 Research in obedience to authority has brought up interesting findings to the 
literature. For instance, Brief, Dietz, Cohen, Pugh & Vaslow (2000) found that 
obedience to authority to engage in discriminatory behavior are masked by seemingly 
rational reasons, on the pretext of business justifications. Much of the research in 
obedience has made reference to Stanley Migram’s obedience experiments, 
undoubtedly a lasting contribution to the social psychology community (Blass, 1992). 
 Using a series of laboratory studies, Stanley Milgram (1974) demonstrated the 
dark side of obedience to authority. Each subject was instructed by an experimenter, 




the authority, to administer electric shocks to another person each time he made 
mistakes in a learning task. While Milgram’s work had a great impact in the research 
field, critics pointed out that his findings have been over-generalized. One critique 
was that the Milgram’s experiments lacked realism so the subjects’ responses may not 
be applicable to contexts apart from those that he had conducted. Some research 
scholars also suggested that subjects in Milgram’s obedience experiments had 
responded according to situational cues that enhanced their inclination to obey the 
authorities (Darley, 1995). First, the internal validity of Milgram’s experiment was 
suspect as subjects might not have felt the extent of the harm they could possibly 
inflict upon the victim, who was actually an accomplice of the experimenter (see 
paper by Miller, 1995). For example, Epstein, Suedfeld, and Silverstein (1973) found 
that participants generally believed that people who took part in human research 
would not be seriously harmed in the experiments. Second, subjects in Milgram’s 
experiments were recruited through advertisements, asking for volunteers for a 
research project on learning (Darley, 1995: 128). They were given an elaborate 
briefing on the mock-up study’s contribution in advancing psychological science. The 
perceived importance of the study’s findings and their participation could have 
induced certain demand characteristics in the subjects. Hence, in their eagerness to 
help the experimenters, the pain they inflict upon the learners became legitimate as the 
process served to advance the study of psychological science that would have 
implications for mankind. Third, Milgram’s subjects may not be the typical person in 
the population. According to Darley’s conjecture (1995), there was a high possibility 
that Milgram’s subjects were people who highly valued scientific research because 
they had responded to a newspaper advertisement to participate in the experiment 




even though the compensation was not substantial (p. 128 – 129). Hence, they could 
be extremely committed in ensuring that the experiment proceeded as planned.   
 Despite critics’ skepticism, Milgram’s laboratory experiments had been 
replicated by numerous researchers outside of North America, namely in Jordan, in 
different pasts of Europe (e.g. Austria) and in Australia (Blass, 1992: 306). With the 
exception of the study in Australia, the rest had similar findings to Milgram’s 
experiments. Although Milgram’s studies have been replicated many times, we choose 
to integrate obedience to authority into our model for two reasons. First, the concept 
of obedience to authority has seldom been applied to research in organizational 
context. Most studies have replicated Milgram’s work in laboratory settings, and 
fewer have applied it to real life context. While our scenarios are simulated incidents, 
our respondents are managers who have experienced similar or related decisions in 
their daily operations. Hence, it would be interesting to investigate their responses to 
authority’s instructions to use electronic monitoring or retrench employees in 
organizational settings. This is also one way of ascertaining the generalizability of 
Milgram’s findings and extending the research beyond the laboratory.  
Second, most of the studies obedience have been conducted in Western nations 
and their generalizabiltiy to Asian nations have not been firmly established. Some 
scholars believe that national culture is an influential factor on managers’ values, 
attitudes and decision making within a nation (Hofstede, 1980; Ralston, Gustafson, 
Elsass, Cheung & Terpstra). Broadly speaking, in some Asian cultures, individuals 
may experience greater inclinations to make decisions that preserve authority-
subordinate or hierarchical relationships. Most Asian societies are influenced by 
Confucian principles, which include respect for hierarchy and authority, respect for 




tradition, loyalty and other related values (The Chinese Culture Connection, 1987). 
Relative to other non-Asian cultures, Asians tend to experience relatively greater 
power distances in their relationships with subordinates or superiors (Hofstede, 1980: 
52). We do expect the effects of obedience to authority to be relatively pronounced in 
Asian contexts. Not only will it influence intentions directly, it will overshadow the 
influence of attitudes, subjective norms, perceived control, self-efficacy and perceived 
worth of efforts in predicting intentions.   
In summary, we believe it is important to investigate whether managers are 
more influenced by accountability pressures or authority’s directive than by their 
personal considerations in the theory of planned behavior. Our central hypothesis is 
that accountability pressures or presence of authority’s directive will weaken the 
relations between attitude, subjective norms, perceived behavioral control, self-
efficacy and intentions. Put it differently, respondents’ decisions to retrench or use 
electronic monitoring may be more influenced by their need to be accountable to 
affected parties or by authority’s instructions than by their attitudes, subjective norms, 
control or self-efficacy factors.  
 
1.2 The Decision Contexts 
We will use a partial model of the theory of planned behavior to predict and 
explain manager’s intentions to use electronic monitoring on employees and retrench 
staff. Specifically, we would like to investigate how attitudes, subjective norms, 
perceived control, self-efficacy and perceived worth of effort influence intentions to 
make the decisions described below. 
Most researchers have applied the theory of planned behavior to social or 




personal contexts. Few have applied the model to organizational research and none 
has used it to predict or explain intentions to retrench or use electronic monitoring. To 
our knowledge, this is likely to be the first study that applied an integrated model of 
the theory of planned behavior to organizational research in an Asian context. The 
decision contexts will be elaborated below. 
  
1.2.1 Employment of Electronic Monitoring  
Electronic monitoring refers to the use of electronic gadgets, networks or 
security systems to monitor and regulate employees’ performances, activities or 
conduct at work. The more common types of electronic surveillance devices used at 
the workplace include video cameras, computer sampling, e-mail interception, access 
codes, expert systems, transaction audit and phone taps in hidden microphones (Oz, 
Glass & Behling, 1999). These monitoring devices can be used to monitor employees’ 
pace of work, degree of accuracy, typing speed, effectiveness in handling customer 
service calls, physical activities, and the amount of time spent on bathroom breaks (Oz 
et al., 1999; Baase, 1997; Aiello & Kolb, 1995).  
The proponents of electronic monitoring believe that the practice enables 
employees to improve on their performance, maximizes customers’ satisfaction 
(Chalykoff & Kochan, 1989), promotes ethical behavior (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 
1999) and prevents abuses of organizational resources (Bequai, 1998). In general, 
supervisors are more in favor of electronic monitoring and less convinced of its 
negative impact than non-supervisors (Oz et al., 1999). From the employees’ 
perspective, the use of electronic monitoring devices is intrusive and violates their 
privacy (Oz et al., 1999). It can also contribute to a decrease in intrinsic motivation 




(Deci & Ryan, 1987) and an increase in unethical behavior (Cialdini, 1996). 
Tenbrunsel & Messick (1999) argued that surveillance and sanctioning systems 
characterized by weak detection probability and minor punishments may even 
contribute to an increase in undesirable behavior at work. Irving, Higgins, & Safayeni 
(1986) found that respondents who were electronically monitored tend to experience 
higher stress, lower morale, decreased job satisfaction and a deterioration of their 
relationships with peers, supervisors and senior management as compared to their 
non-monitored counterparts. Other general criticisms of the practice included lack of 
involvement, reduced task variety and clarity, reduced peer’s social support and 
supervisory support, fear of job loss, reduced control over task and creation of 
negative tensions between managers and supervisors (Oz et al., 1999). 
According to Brey (1999), electronic monitoring may reduce worker autonomy 
in a few ways. First, the monitoring process allows supervisors to correct and change 
the employees’ work processes. That might seem viable and useful but such actions 
may also reduce creativity if employees work to meet the monitoring criteria rather 
than try new ways of working. Second, monitoring might reduce employees’ moral 
autonomy, the control that individuals have over their self-concept and moral identity. 
When people are closely monitored, they might feel that their identities are partially 
determined by people’s judgments. That could result in them conceptualizing 
themselves as dependent and dehumanized.  Hence, decision makers who plan to 
implement the electronic monitoring system based solely on a cost-benefit analysis are 
likely to face challenges in the form of lower morale and productivity in the long run.  
 




1.2.2 Retrenchment of Employees 
Downsizing, retrenchment or reduction in workforce is an organizational 
reality. According to an annual mid-year survey by American Management 
Association (AMA), 58% of the 1631 surveyed companies reported eliminating jobs 
in the 12 months ending 30 June 2001 (American Management Association, 2001). 
That was the highest percentage of jobs eliminated since the 1990-1991 recession. In 
Singapore, the prospects seemed just as bleak. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 and 
the current global slowdown have badly affected the Singapore economy (The Straits 
Times, 20 April 2002). The National Trade Union Congress expected as many as 
20,000 workers to be laid off in year 2002, a slight improvement over the figures in 
the previous year, in which more than 25, 000 workers were retrenched  (The Straits 
Times, 21 June 2002). In the banking sector, older workers with low qualifications 
were the worst hit (The Straits Times, 1 May 2002). Professionals and executives were 
also not spared in retrenchment exercises (The Straits Times, 20 April 2002).  
In the AMA survey report, North American businesses listed five main reasons 
for the layoff exercises (American Management Association, 2001). They were 
decreased market demand, organizational restructuring, reengineering of business 
processes, automation or new technologies, and transfer or relocation of work. The 
situation is rather similar to the Singapore context. Retrenchments persist as 
organizations cut costs, consolidate their operations, undergo mergers and automate 
their operations (The Straits Times, 7 June 2002; 21 June 2002; 5 Aprila 2002; 17 
March 2002).  
Downsizing has long and short term negative effects on job performance 
(Armstrong-Stassen, 2002) and employees’ work attitudes, such as organizational 




commitment, job satisfaction and workgroup trust (Wager, 2001; Luthans & Sommer, 
1999). It has also been linked to increased grievances, higher absenteeism, workplace 
conflict, and poorer supervisor-union member relations (Wager, 2001).  
Individuals who were laid off and perceived their organizations as having poor 
procedures for layoff have expressed a desire for regulation of layoffs and a  
reluctance to recommend the past employers to others (Konovsky & Folger, 1991). 
Similarly, survivors of downsizing who perceive layoff procedures at their 
organizations to be unfair tend to experience negative attitudes such as lower morale, 
self-esteem, organizational commitment, trust, and productivity (Wanberg, Bunce & 
Gavin, 1999: 60).  
Managers who lay off employees in an abrupt and insensitive manner 
inevitably create resentment amongst laid-off employees and lower the morale of 
employees left behind (Folger & Skarlicki, 1998). Demonstrating sensitivity towards 
the laid-off employees can enhance perceived fairness of the decisions and offset the 
negative responses experienced during the layoffs (Brockner, DeWitt, Grover, & 
Reed, 1990; Konovsky & Folger, 1991). Organizations that fail to give dignified exits 
for retrenched workers reflect poorly on their corporate culture and sense of 
professionalism. Recently, the United Overseas Bank, a Singapore organization,  was 
criticized for the way in which it laid off its workers (The Straits Times, 5 Aprila 
2002). It locked its retrenched workers out of its computer system immediately and 
gave them short notice to pack their belongings (The Straits Times, 17 March 2002).  
Retrenchment is likely to become more prevalent as industry structure 
changes. In view of its implications, it is therefore important to study managerial 
responses to retrenchment issues. 





Building our conjectures on a theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1988; 1991), 
we will explore how decision makers’ attitudes, subjective norms and perceived 
behavioral control influence their intentions to use electronic monitoring and retrench 
employees. The following chapter will provide an overview of the literature on the 
theory of planned behavior, present the proposed variables to augment the model and 
the hypotheses for the study.  
 




The theory of planned behavior (Azjen, 1991), an extension of the theory of 
reasoned action, has been widely used in Social Psychology and Organization 
Behavior to examine decision making. More than 250 empirical investigations have 
been based on the two theories (Manstead & van der Pligt, 1998: 1313) and there is a 
growing interest in refining their constructs.  
Briefly, the theory of planned behavior posits that when people need to make a 
decision, their behavioral intentions are influenced by their attitudes, perceived 
subjective norms and perceived behavioral control. According to Ajzen (1991), both 
intentions and perceived behavioral control are useful in the prediction of behavior. 
However, their relative importance may differ across behaviors or contexts. Figure 1 
shows the relations between the variables in the theory of planned behavior. In both 
the theory of reasoned action and the theory of planned behavior, the actor’s intention 
is a key outcome variable.  











                                                 
1 Note:  Theory of Planned Behavior (with Perceived Behavioral Control) 
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According to Ajzen (1991), intention measures the amount of effort people are 
willing to put in to perform a behavior and captures the motivational factors that affect 
the behavior. Generally, the stronger the intention to perform a behavior, the more 
likely the behavior will take place. The theory of planned behavior model could 
explain between 19 to 40 percent of the variance in behavior (Sutton, 1998; Sheeran & 
Orbell,1999). Past and recent work with the model indicated strong associations 
between behavioral intentions and actual behavior (Ajzen & Madden, 1986; Ajzen, 
1988; 1991; DeVries, Backbier, Kok, & Dijkstra, 1995; Rutter, 2000; Sheeran & 
Orbell, 2000; Orbell et al., 2001). Hence, we will measure only the individual’s 
behavioral intentions as the outcome variable. 
 
2.1 Predicting Intentions: Attitudes, Subjective Norms & Perceived 
Behavioral Control  
There are three main independent predictors of behavioral intention in the 
theory of planned behavior: the attitude towards the behavior, subjective norms 
regarding the behavior and the degree of perceived behavioral control over the 
behavior (Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen & Madden, 1986). Theoretically, the more favorable the 
attitude and subjective norms are toward a behavior, and the greater the perceived 
behavioral control, the stronger the person’s intention to perform the behavior under 
consideration.  
Using the results of 16 studies, Ajzen reported that the three predictors 
accounted for a substantial amount of variance in intentions, with the multiple 
correlations ranging between 0.43 and 0.94 (1991). The results also provided 
empirical support to the integration of the construct, perceived behavioral control, as 




part of the theory of planned behavior. More recently, reviews showed that the 
predictors could explain 40 to 50 percent of variance in behavioral intentions (Sutton, 
1998; Sheeran & Orbell, 1999; Armitage & Conner, 2001).  
 Beginning the discussion on attitude, these three predictors will be 
individually elaborated in the following sections.  
 
2.2 Attitude: Definition and Role in the Theory of Planned Behavior 
According to Ajzen, attitude is “a disposition to respond favorably or 
unfavorably to an object, person, institution or event (1988: 4). Attitude directs or 
guides human behavior (Fazio, 1990; Ajzen, 1996). It is evaluative and can lead to 
judgments of the object, such as harmful-beneficial and pleasant-unpleasant (Ajzen, 
1988, 2001; Ajzen & Krebs, 1994).  
The two basic attitude-behavior models in mainstream research are: the 
controlled process model and the automatic-process model (Ajzen, 1996). The theory 
of planned behavior belongs to the former, a process that allows the decision maker to 
engage in extensive deliberation prior to making the decision. An example of the latter 
is Fazio’s MODE model, which emphasizes the spontaneous process by which 
attitudes influence behavior (Fazio, 1990; Ajzen, 1996).  
The theory of planned behavior addresses planned and deliberate social 
behavior. The process involves an analysis or evaluation of the positive and negative 
features of the attitude object and the probable outcomes of performing a particular 
course of action (Fazio, 1990). Attitudes toward a behavior are influenced by a 
person’s behavioral beliefs (Ajzen, 1991). According to Ajzen (1991), one forms 
beliefs about an object by associating it with certain characteristics, events, or objects. 




Each belief associates the behavior with a certain outcome such as the benefits or 
costs of performing the behavior. In this manner, one learns to prefer behaviors 
associated with desirable consequences and form unfavorable attitudes toward 
behaviors associated with undesirable consequences. The consideration of the 
responses to the decisions in this study are likely to be serious and cognitively 
demanding. Therefore, decision makers need to carefully weigh alternatives and 
consider the potential consequences of preferring one option over another. 
There is compelling support for the role of attitudes in predicting behavioral 
intentions (Kurland, 1996; Sheeran & Orbell, 1999; 2000; Orbell et al., 2001). Thus, 
we can expect attitude to influence the decision maker’s intentions to use electronic 
monitoring and retrench employees. We therefore predict that: 
H1: Business managers’ intentions to use electronic monitoring or to retrench 
employees are positively associated with their attitudes toward each behavior. 
 
 
2.3 Subjective Norms: Definition and Role in the Theory of Planned 
Behavior 
Subjective norms refer to the “perceived social pressure to perform or not to 
perform the behavior” (Ajzen, 1991: 188). These pressures could come from referent 
others whose opinions are regarded as important or helpful. Important referents may 
include a person’s parents, spouse, close friends, colleagues or experts such as tax 
accountants or medical advisers (Ajzen, 1988). Although subjective norm is 
considered an established predictor of intentions in the theory of planned behavior 
model, it did not show any discernible patterns in predicting intentions and behavior in 
some studies (Ajzen, 1991) and conflicting results continue to emerge among more 




recent work.   
Flannery and May (2000) found subjective norm to be a significant predictor 
of managers’ environmental decision making but Kurland (1996) did not find it to be a 
significant predictor of insurance agents’ ethical intentions toward clients. One 
possible reason for the inconsistent findings is that environmental decision making is a 
visible issue and its effects are not confined to the organization or decision makers. It 
can be viewed as an important social dilemma since its negative externalities are 
usually borne by members of the public (e.g. gaseous chemicals from factories pollute 
the air of the surrounding neighborhood). The visibility of the issue, and the negative 
effects which could possibly follow its execution, might have magnified the perceived 
social pressures exerted by referent others. In contrast, the potential effects of the 
insurance agents’ actions in Kurland’s study could be less drastic and more contained. 
The behaviors were less visible to observers, so the perceived social pressure to 
comply to referent others’ expected behavior was less salient.  Hence, subjective 
norms played a less important role in the prediction of insurance agents’ behavioral 
intentions. Other studies that did not demonstrate the contribution of subjective norms 
to the variance of behavioral intentions included Sheeran & Orbell’s (2000) 
investigation of exercising behavior. It is likely that subjective norms had limited 
influence because the behavior (exercising) was relatively self-motivated and probably 
required little or no social pressure from others. Since the decisions in this study are 
visible issues, and not self-motivated, they are likely to trigger perceived social 
pressures from important others.  
Referent groups may be contingent on the context. Orbell et al. (2001) 
examined the perceived social pressures that Ecstasy users experienced from friends. 




He replaced the usual wording for the subjective norm item, “Most people who are 
important to me think I should not take ecstasy”, with “Most friends who are 
important to me…”. It was an appropriate change as the behavior was one that 
involved peer pressures so the authors used friends as the sole referent group for the 
respondents. In this study, we examine managers’ responses to work dilemmas. 
Hence, we assume that organizational members are likely to be the salient referent 
group that will influence the managers’ decisions. We hypothesize that: 
H2:  Business managers’ intentions to use electronic monitoring or retrench 
employees are positively associated with their perceived social pressures from 
organizational referent others to perform the behaviors.  
 
 
2.4 Perceived Behavioral Control: Definition and Role in the Theory of 
Planned Behavior 
Perceived behavioral control refers to “people’s perception of the ease or 
difficulty of performing the behavior of interest” (Ajzen, 1991: 183), a concept akin to 
perceived self-efficacy, which refers to “judgments of how well one can execute 
courses of action required to deal with prospective situations” (Bandura, 1982: 122). 
Ajzen and other researchers differentiate between the internal and external factors that 
contribute towards a person’s perceived behavioral control (Ajzen, 1988; Ajzen & 
Madden, 1986; Flannery & May, 2000). Internal factors generally refer to individual 
dispositional characteristics such as the decision maker’s skills, abilities, emotions, 
compulsions or the knowledge one has regarding the specific behavior (Ajzen, 1988). 
On the other hand, external factors are characteristics of the situation that either 
facilitate or hinder the behavioral achievement (Ajzen, 1988).   
Ajzen (1988) created three items to measure perceived behavioral control. In 




the context of class attendance, participants were asked to rate on 7-point scales, the 
extent to which they felt in control of attending all classes (Ajzen & Madden, 1986). 
The questions were: “How much control do you have over whether you do or do not 
attend this class every session…complete control-very little control?”, “For me to 
attend every session of this class is….easy-difficult”, and “If I wanted to, I could 
easily attend this class every session….extremely likely-extremely unlikely”. 
Confirmatory factor analysis showed that these three items loaded under one factor 
with an α coefficient of 0.74.  
Empirical studies have produced mixed results on the usefulness of perceived 
behavioral control. Some studies found perceived behavioral control to significantly 
predict decision makers’ behavioral intentions (e.g. Kurland, 1996; Chang, 1998; 
Sheeran & Orbell, 2000; Orbell et al., 2001) but others did not (e.g. Hill et. al., 1996; 
Cordano & Frieze, 2000). Several researchers had encountered problems in the 
conceptualization and operationalization of the perceived behavioral control construct 
(see Sparks, Guthrie & Shepherd, 1997 for a review). One critical problem 
experienced by researchers was the difficulty in achieving acceptable inter-item 
reliabilities for the perceived behavioral control measures (Sparks, 1994; Chan & 
Fishbein, 1993; Beale & Manstead, 1991).  
Armitage, Conner, Loach & Willetts (1999) argued that poor internal 
reliability of perceived behavioral control showed a failure to distinguish the separate 
components in the construct. They maintained that ease or difficulty of performing a 
behavior could be used to refer to both internal or external factors. For example, a 
behavior may be rated easy if the person was confident and believed that he or she had 
the needed skills to execute it, a concept similar to Bandura’s (1982) concept of self-




efficacy. Likewise, a behavior was perceived as easy if its execution was not hindered 
by external factors (e.g. people or events), a concept similar to perceived control. 
Confirming their conjectures, Armitage et al. (1999) found that respondents 
distinguished between self-efficacy and perceived control over alcohol consumption 
and cannabis usage. Manstead & van Eekelen (1998) also found that items used in 
previous research to measure self-efficacy and perceived behavioral control could be 
separated into two components. In fact, self-efficacy was a stronger predictor than 
perceived behavioral control of intentions to achieve a particular grade across different 
academic subjects.  
Other researchers have also suggested distinguishing self-efficacy as a separate 
construct from perceived behavioral control (Terry & O’Leary, 1995; White, Terry & 
Hogg, 1994). Terry & O’Leary (1995) likened perceived behavioral control to 
outcome expectancies, which were different from efficacy expectations. They 
suggested using behavioral control to only represent “external” factors and exclude 
self-efficacy perceptions as it reflected control factors derived from the person, rather 
than the environment.  
Ajzen and other researchers have applied the perceived control and perceived 
ease/difficulty measures as a representation of the person’s self-efficacy. Some 
researchers have also used the term, self-efficacy, interchangeably with perceived 
behavioral control. Sparks et al., (1997) commented that this could be a problematic 
practice as Bandura’s self-efficacy was usually measured in a different way from that 
defined by the theory of planned behavior. While the measures of perceived 
behavioral control make explicit reference to perceived control and perceived ease or 
difficulty of engaging in a particular behavior, the mainstream research on self-




efficacy usually measures the construct with items that evaluate an individual’s level 
of confidence or degree of sureness in performing a behavior.  
The above findings seem to suggest that, conceptually, the components of 
perceived behavioral control can be separated into internal (e.g. self-efficacy) and 
external factors (e.g. perceived control). Operationally, perceived behavioral control 
can be measured by items with explicit reference to perceived control and self-
efficacy of performing the behavior in question. To avoid the complications 
mentioned by Sparks et al. (1997), we used the self-efficacy items employed in 
mainstream research to measure the variable. We also adapted Ajzen’s (1991) 
perceived behavioral control items to represent the measure for perceived control. On 
an exploratory basis, we included another aspect, perceived worth of effort needed to 
perform a task, to the construct.  
 
2.4.1 Perceived Worth of Effort 
Perceived effort is defined as “the amount of energy, time and resources the 
decision maker believes he or she has to invest in a behavior” (adapted from Mohr & 
Bitner, 1995: 243). According to Brehm’s theory of psychological reactance, 
individuals become motivationally energized to the degree that is deemed essential for 
the achievement of objectives under two conditions: possibility of obtaining the goal 
and the outcome being worth the effort (Wright, 1984). Attractiveness of the outcome 
increases as the difficulty of attaining the goal rises. However, when it becomes too 
difficult to achieve the goal or its achievement is not worth the effort, motivation and 
attractiveness should also decline. Relating this to our study, we may expect managers 
to use electronic monitoring or retrench employees if they were worth their efforts to 




do so. All work roles require some expenditure of energy (Vroom, 1964). According 
to most general theories of behavior, expenditure of efforts produces dissatisfaction 
(Hull, 1943; Tolman, 1959). Hull had given his preliminary proposition as follows: 
“Whenever any reaction is evoked in an organism, there is left a condition or state 
which acts as a primary negative motivation in that it has an innate capacity to 
produce a cessation of the activity which produced the state” (1943: 278). Hull and his 
colleagues called the state or condition reactive inhibition. The reactive inhibition 
weakens the strength of the response to the stimulus that first motivates the person to 
perform the behavior. Considerable evidence supports the observation that given two 
or more routes to achieving the same goals, an organism will learn to take the route 
that requires the least effort (Thompson, 1944; Solomon, 1948).  
However, others have counter-proposed that the expenditure of effort could be 
fulfilling rather than dissatisfying. The view is that people experience physical well-
being when they engage in hard physical labor, as in games and sports. Consistent 
with Brehm’s theory, Vroom (1964) proposed to reconcile these seemingly opposite 
theories with the concept of optimal level of activity. Below the optimal level of effort 
expenditure, the organism experiences dissatisfaction and increases effort. Above the 
optimal level, the organism experiences fatigue and eventually dissatisfaction, leading 
to decreased effort.  
We expect that a decision maker will estimate the perceived effort of engaging 
in alternative courses of action. If an alternative takes too much effort to act or is not 
worth the effort, one is unlikely to act. Hence, we predict that the higher the perceived 
worth of effort expended for a particular decision, the greater the intentions to engage 
in the task.  




In summary, we posit that business managers who are self-efficacious, 
perceive high control over the use of electronic monitoring and judge its use as worth 
the efforts, will be inclined to use it. Likewise, business managers who are self-
efficacious, perceive high control over the retrenchment decision and perceive the 
efforts of retrenching employees as worthwhile, are likely to do so. Hence, we 
hypothesize that: 
H3a: Business managers’ intentions to use electronic monitoring on employees are 
positively associated with their level of self-efficacy, perceived control and 
perceived worth of efforts to use electronic monitoring. 
 
H3b:  Business managers’ intentions to retrench employees are positively associated 
with their level of self-efficacy, perceived control and perceived worth of 
efforts to retrench the employees. 
 
 
2.4.2 Attribution Theory: Causal Explanations  
On an exploratory basis, we will assess the factors that managers attribute to 
after they have made their decisions in the ethical dilemmas. Does a person’s self-
efficacy, perceived worth of effort, perceived control in coping with ethical dilemmas, 
or a combination of any of these variables, determine his or her intentions? These 
proposed dimensions of perceived behavioral control are similar to Weiner’s (1974) 
causal attributions in the attributional model of achievement. The concept of 
attribution refers to specific causal explanations for events (Heider, 1985; Kelley & 
Michela, 1980).  
According to the attributional model, people generally employ four types of 
self-attributions to predict the outcome of an achievement-related event. They are 
ability, task difficulty, effort and luck. Although there were other causal explanations, 
such as bad mood or fatigue, Weiner and his colleagues had consistently found these 
four causal explanations as the most common causes of performance outcomes 




(Weiner, 1974).  
Likewise, we are interested to examine the factors individuals attribute to after 
they have made their choices (intentions). The concepts of self-efficacy, perceived 
worth of efforts and perceived control are similar to the concepts of ability, effort and 
luck in Weiner’s studies. For the purpose of this study, we view causal attribution to 
luck as similar to causal attribution to perceived control. The concept of luck as a 
causal explanation is inferred from a person’s perceived lack of personal control over 
events and processes that lead to the outcomes in life. Hence, it is tantamount to the 
concept of perceived control introduced in this chapter. Moreover, it makes more 
sense to state whether one’s perceived control rather than luck, will influence one’s 
choice to use electronic monitoring and retrench employees.  
  
2.5 The Role of Accountability Pressures and Presence of Legitimate 
Authority’s Directive on the Theory of Planned Behavior 
In discussing the sufficiency of the theory of planned behavior, Ajzen himself 
concluded that the theory was, “in principle, open to the inclusion of additional 
predictors if it can be shown that they capture a significant proportion of the variance 
in intention or behavior after the theory’s current variables have been taken into 
account” (1991: 199). Researchers have since attempted to augment the theory by 
adding predictors such as personal or moral norms in ethical decision making 
(Kurland, 1996; Harland et al., 1999; Flannery & May, 2000); self-schemas with 
regards to exercising decision (Sheeran & Orbell, 2000); self-identity concerning 
adherence to a low-fat diet (Sparks & Guthrie, 1998); anticipated emotions towards 
weight regulation behavior (Perugini & Bagozzi, 2001); anticipated regret and 




descriptive norms in lottery playing (Sheeran & Orbell, 1999); and past repeated 
behavior (habit) on Ecstasy usage (Orbell et al., 2001).   
While several studies have sought to augment the theory of planned behavior 
with additional predictors (Ajzen, 2001), fewer have examined the interaction effects 
of new variables with current predictors in the model. Studies that belong to the latter 
category have tested the moderating influence of self-consciousness and self-
monitoring (Miller & Grush, 1986), need for cognition (Ajzen, 1988), decision 
maker’s desires (Perugini & Bagozzi, 2001), and magnitude of consequences 
(Flannery & May, 2000) on the theory of planned behavior. Studies that used Ajzen’s 
model have demonstrated the inadequacy of the existing predictors in determining 
one’s intentions for certain situations or people (e.g. Miller & Grush, 1986; Trafimow 
& Fishbein, 1995). This suggests that there could be individual or situational factors 
that moderate the relations within the theory of planned behavior. These reasons 
motivated us to examine how two variables, accountability pressures and presence of 
legitimate authority’s directive, may influence intentions or moderate the relations 
between the predictors and the outcome variable. Describing the organizational person 
as a politician, Tetlock (1985) highlighted the importance of interpersonal 
consequences of decisions made by individuals. It is therefore fundamental to identify 
one’s cognitive processes as well as understand the effects of social and organizational 








2.5.1 Accountability Pressures 
Accountability for one’s behavior is understood to be a universal characteristic 
of natural decision environments (Tetlock, 1985). To be accountable is to be prepared 
to answer for one’s behavior (Schlenker, Weigold, & Doherty, 1991: 96) If we assume 
that people have the choice to monitor and regulate their behaviors, then 
“accountability is a critical rule and norm enforcement mechanism: the social 
psychological link between individual decision makers on the one hand and the social 
systems to which they belong on the other” (Tetlock, 1985: 307). As people are 
usually expected to be accountable for their conduct or actions, the anticipated 
consequences of one’s decisions influence one’s behaviors.  
Accountability is a way of maintaining social order (Haines & Jost, 2000). 
When faced with an unfavorable decision, people would search for an explanation 
(Wong & Weiner, 1981). In organizational situations, decision makers may need to 
account for their decisions to parties who are affected by their choices. The perceived 
fairness of the procedures that led to the decision would be judged according to any 
causal information about the appropriateness of the decision maker’s behavior (Wong 
& Weiner, 1981). An acceptable justification can influence observers and victims’ 
perceptions of fairness of the decision outcomes. Justification claiming mitigating 
circumstances has been shown to lead to higher ratings of procedural fairness (Bies & 
Shapiro, 1988). Faced with accountability pressures, decision makers are likely to 
experience a greater sense of responsibility for the decisions made and are more 
mindful of the negative implications for affected parties.  
Not all decisions need to be accounted for, especially if the matter concerns a 
choice that has minimal or no effect on others’ welfare (Huber & Seiser, 2001). 




Justification or accountability pressures can have effects on decision outcomes and 
result in more complex and comprehensive information processing (Brockner, 1992; 
Garling, Karlsson, Romanus, & Selart, 1997; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock, 1992; 
Tetlock et al., 1989). They can lead to escalation of commitment to a losing course of 
action (Brockner, 1992), more ambiguity avoidance choices (Curley, Yates & 
Abrams, 1986) and more risk-avoidance behavior (Tetlock & Boettger, 1989). 
However, there were also studies that showed the opposite effects, that is, justification 
pressures did not reduce decision errors or risk-taking behavior (Simonson & Nye, 
1992; Takemura, 1993).  
Accountability  has several empirically distinguishable components (Lerner 
and Tetlock, 1999). One of these components is reason-giving, i.e., actors are 
expected to provide explanations for their decisions, opinions or behavior (for an 
example of specific research findings, see Wilson & Lafleur, 1995). Besides the 
distinct types of accountability, there are also various forms of accountability 
relationships. There are those whose audience’s views are not known and also those 
whose audiences’ views are known to the decision makers in the pre-decision stage. 
Nonetheless, irrespective of whether people are aware of their audiences’ opinions, 
they would still seek to gain approval and favorable responses from their audiences 
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995). In our study, managers would be able to anticipate 
negative or unfavorable responses from employees who are “victims” of the 
retrenchment exercises or the use of electronic monitoring. Hence, audiences’ views 
are presumably made known to the managers in the pre-decision stage. The priming of 
a particular audience, such that decision makers are aware that they are accountable to 
a particular audience with known views at the pre-decisional stage, will result in 




decision makers shifting their attitudes toward that of the audience (Lerner and 
Tetlock, 1999; Schlenker & Pontari, 2000: 213; Tetlock et al., 1989). They are likely 
to support positions that will gain the approval of people to whom they are 
accountable to. Conformity to audiences’ views is an easier solution as it allows 
decision makers to avoid the cognitively demanding task of evaluating various 
options, analyzing elaborate information and making tough decisions (Lerner and 
Tetlock, 1999).  
According to Tetlock (1985), there are a few major reasons why people desire 
to have the approval and respect of people to whom they are accountable. People are 
inherently driven to protect and enhance their social image and identity as ends-in-
themselves (p. 308). To different extent, people experience the need to elicit 
approving responses from others around them. Another reason why people seek the 
approval and respect of others is to protect and enhance their self-image (Tetlock, 
1985: 308 – 309). This viewpoint suggests that people seek positive evaluation as a 
means to reinforce their beliefs about their self-worth on important characteristics 
such as intelligence and maturity. People desire to create and preserve desirable public 
and private images. They feel worried when their image or identities are threatened by 
negative circumstances (Schlenker et al., 1991). Given that the managers in our study 
experience explicit pressures to be accountable to their employees and are involved in 
making decisions that have negative implications for the same group, they are likely to 
feel that their social and self-images are at stake. It is probable that decision makers 
may make choices that are more favorable to the parties they are accountable to, 
compared to when they are not obliged to be accountable to anyone at all.  
A combination of responses could be expected when the decision maker is 




accountable to multiple audiences, who may hold either harmonious or conflicting 
opinions (Tetlock, 1985). In our study, this possibility was controlled for in that only 
accountability to affected parties was made salient to respondents. Justification 
pressure has a distinct effect on the choice process (Huber & Seiser, 2001). High 
accountability presents a strong situation that will influence decision maker’s 
behavioral intentions. Therefore, we expect that: 
H4: The need for accountability to affected parties moderates the relation between 
the predictors of theory of planned behavior (i.e. attitudes, subjective norms 
and perceived behavioral control) and behavioral intentions to use electronic 
monitoring or retrench employees. Attitudes, subjective norms or perceived 
behavioral control will have greater influence on behavioral intentions when 





2.5.2 Presence of Legitimate Authority’s Directives 
Another contextual factor that is likely to strongly influence the decision 
maker’s intentions is his or her tendency to obey instructions from legitimate authority 
on the appropriate course of action to take when facing ethical dilemmas. This could 
be especially important if ethical dilemmas occur in organizations that have no clear 
ethical codes or principles.  The decision maker is likely to use his own judgment, or 
take cues from superiors or colleagues (Sheffert, 2001). 
Obedience to authority is a form of social influence that can be destructive, if 
blindly adhered to (Milgram, 1974). In Milgram’s experiments on obedience in the 
early 1960s (1974), 65 percent of the participants displayed total obedience to the 
experimenter’s instructions in delivering maximum voltage of shocks to a learner (an 
accomplice to the experimenter), even though they were made to believe that the 
shocks were painful and could even be fatal to the recipient.  The experiments were a 




shocking revelation that total obedience to authority’s directives, even for the wrong 
reasons, was not solely applicable to the German soldiers who committed atrocities 
during the 2nd World War. Subsequently, variations of Milgram’s experiments were 
administered to participants of different nationality, gender and age and the results 
were largely similar in nature (Blass, 2000).  
Intuitively, the fact that some participants protested or refused to continue the 
experiment was an indication that there could be individual or situational factors that 
influenced people’s propensity to obey authority. A person’s characteristics have been 
found to influence his or her predisposition to obey. These personal characteristics 
include authoritarian submission – the predisposition to take on a compliant and 
unquestioning attitude toward authority figures (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick & 
Levinson, 1950) and internal-external locus of control dimension – the individual’s 
perception of their personal control over his or her outcomes (Rotter, 1971). Milgram 
(1974) also found that the authority figure’s reputation and proximity to the subject, as 
well as the presence of other disobedient people, had effects on the subject’s 
obedience. This study will only examine one aspect – legitimate authority – as it is 
one of the main features that characterize the nature of authority.  
More recent studies confirm the negative impact of obedience pressures. Brief, 
Dietz, Cohen, Pugh & Vaslow (2000) found that irrespective of their own racial 
attitudes, employees would engage in discriminatory hiring practices under instruction 
from higher authorities, who gave business justifications as explanations for 
discriminatory practices. This obedience to legitimate authority superseded the 
employees’ personal considerations even if it was inconsistent with their own moral 
values and judgment.  




Past research has also indicated that culturally influenced factors such as 
collectivism or hierarchy can influence behavior of organizational actors (Hamilton & 
Sanders, 1995: 71). Hamilton and Sanders (1995) suggest that situations that “involve 
obedience are more likely to excuse the actor of responsibility in relatively 
collectivistic cultures (Japan, Russia) than in more individualistic cultures (United 
States)” (p. 72). As an Asian country, Singapore can be perceived as a relatively 
collectivistic nation. It is highly probable that Singaporean managers or observers of 
situations that involve obedience could be more “lenient” or forgiving of themselves 
or others in obeying authorities’ instructions that lead to negative consequences for 
others. That is, while observers in collectivistic cultures feel that actors could be 
excused of responsibility in situations that involve obedience, actors themselves may 
also perceive their situations in the same manner. Actors may excuse themselves for 
obeying higher authorities’ instructions and making decisions that cause negative 
consequences for others because they perceive such behavior as the norm or as 
expected in a collectivistic or hierarchical system.  
A country’s culture and societal norms can have a large influence on its people 
in various ways. For instance, various researchers have suggested that the early 
economic success of Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore, could 
largely be due to the influence of Confucianism (The Chinese Culture Connection, 
1987; Yeung & Tung, 1996). As proposed by Ralson, Gustafson, Cheung, and 
Terpstra (1993), culture and the business environment interact to produce an 
indigenous set of managerial values in a country (p. 249). They presented two 
perspectives of managerial values across cultures. The convergence perspective of 
culture suggests that industrialization and adoption of Western’s free enterprise 




system result in the non-western nations assuming Western values. The divergence 
perspective proposes that different countries’ managerial values is predominantly 
influenced by indigenous cultural values, and that this will over-ride the impact of 
westernization or industrialization. Using samples of managers from the United States, 
Hong Kong and China, Ralston et al., (1993) found that their results support both the 
divergence and convergence perspectives, and also the crossvergence view. While 
Singapore is an Asian society, it has become very much a cosmopolitan city. On the 
societal level, various races’ have their roots in respective cultures and heritage. 
However, being an open economy that is open to foreign influence, its local culture 
has also interspersed with foreign values and practices. While we do not expect to see 
Singapore on extreme ends of cultural dimensions, such as masculinity-feminism 
(Hofstede, 1980), we do believe that elements of its Asian heritage are likely to inhibit 
or reinforce certain behaviors or thinking.  
Hofstede (1980) defined national cultures into four dimensions, one of which 
is power distance. Power distance refers to the extent to which members of a culture 
perceive the distribution of power in society’s entities (Robertson, 2000). This 
characteristic or expression is usually manifested in the superior-subordinate 
relationship. People who embrace high power distance values tend to accept power 
differences in relationships and view inequality between people as legitimate 
(Robertson, 2000). In general, they fear disagreement with their superiors and prefers 
superiors who make decisions autocratically or paternalistically (Hofstede, 1980). 
Given that obedience to authority has been shown to have a strong influence on one’s 
behavior in Western contexts, this characteristic is likely to be more pronounced in 
Asian countries with high power distance scores. Based on Hofstede’s (1980: 52) 




findings, Singapore is ranked number 40 out of 50 countries in terms of power 
distance, which makes it a country with relatively high power distance. With a culture 
that is generally perceptive, accepting of power differences and respectful of 
authorities, there is a strong possibility that decision makers in Singapore tend to be 
supportive of their authorities’ instructions. That being the case, presence of 
authority’s presence is likely to present itself as a strong situational cue that influences 
one’s intentions to retrench or use electronic monitoring and weaken the current 
predictors’ effects on intentions. 
The application of legitimate authority’s directives as a moderator is not to be 
confused with the antecedent to intentions, perceived subjective norms. While 
subjective norms were conceptualized as perceived social pressures, pressures to obey 
legitimate authority was manipulated objectively in the form of actual instructions 
delivered by superiors or management regarding the appropriate response to a 
dilemma.  Hence, we may expect an interaction effect between the various antecedents 
and directives given by a legitimate authority. 
H5: The presence of a legitimate authority’s directive moderates the relation 
between the predictors of theory of planned behavior (i.e. attitudes, subjective 
norms and perceived behavioral control) and behavioral intentions to use 
electronic monitoring or retrench employees. Attitudes, subjective norms or 
perceived behavioral control will have greater influence on behavioral 
intentions when authority’s directive is absent than when it is present.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the proposed theoretical model for this study is presented in 
Figure 2. The following chapter will describe the method and procedures used for the 
study.  
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3.1 Use of Vignettes 
Vignettes are often used in ethical decision making research (please see Frey, 
2000; Flannery & May, 2000; Singer & Singer, 1997; Harrington, 1997; Singhapakdi, 
Vitell & Craft, 1996). In this study, they were used to elicit participants’ responses to 
two ethical dilemmas: the use of electronic monitoring and retrenchment. Participants 
were requested to read the vignettes, place themselves in the position of the decision 
maker and respond to the questions that followed.  
The use of vignettes was appropriate in this study for at least three reasons. 
First, they include contextual information and allow researchers to capture real-life 
situations (Alexander & Becker, 1978: 103). Realism was important in this study as 
respondents had to make decisions concerning ethical dilemmas in organizations. 
Second, the vignettes provided a standardized decision context (Alexander & Becker, 
1978), allowing comparisons of the different conditions to be made across responses. 
The standardized context also reduced the possibility of participants’ imagining 
themselves in different situations as they responded to the survey items. Third, the 
ethical dilemmas used in this study were not directly observable in everyday life. The 
majority of the respondents perceived them as ethical issues. It would be extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to conduct experiments, observational studies or interviews 
on people who made similar decisions in their organizations. The scenario or vignette 
method provided a less intrusive method of studying participants’ responses to ethical 
dilemmas in their organizations.  
The target respondents for this study were business managers. Prior to 
administering the vignette surveys to the managers, they were pre-tested on students 
and working adults. The following sections describe the procedures and measures 




used in the pre-test surveys and the final survey. For the purpose of this research, the 
term “vignette” is used interchangeably with the term “scenario”. 
 
3.2 Pre-tests 
The purpose of conducting the pre-tests was to test the various items in the 
survey to see which worked best to measure the variables, and remove those which did 
not work well. The surveys were first pre-tested on thirty-two business undergraduates 
in a local university. The undergraduates were each paid $3 and given a chance to 
participate in a lucky draw with cash prizes as incentives to do the surveys. Besides 
doing the surveys, the participants were requested to critique the content, clarity, 
presentation and length of the surveys. Then the survey was revised and pre-tested on 
20 working adults, holding either managerial or executive positions in organizations. 
Similarly, the participants did the surveys and were encouraged to critique the survey 
design. Based on the items’ face validity, stability of factor loadings (Chen, Gully & 
Eden, 2001), reliability analyses, respondents’ critiques and researchers’ discussions, 
selected items were removed from the survey after the two pre-tests.  
 
3.3 Administration of Surveys  
After the pre-tests, the self-administered vignette surveys were mailed to 
business managers from 580 organizations. Each set of surveys, complete with a cover 
letter, business reply envelopes and a response slip to request for the study’s results, 
were mailed to specific contact persons working at the organizations (see Appendix 
B).  
 




We adopted principles from Dillman’s (1986) total design method for the 
design and administration of the final survey. To increase aesthetic appeal, the surveys 
were printed as booklets on pale yellow papers (Dillman, 1986: 121). No questions 
were placed on the covers of the booklets and questions that were similar in content 
were grouped together (Dillman, 1986: 121, 124). A cover letter explained the 
usefulness of the research and tried to persuade the contact person that his or her 
assistance was important to the study (Dillman, 1986: 165, 168). Efforts were made to 
demonstrate that the contact person’s assistance was important. The contact person’s 
name, organization’s name and salutation were printed on the cover letter. Each cover 
letter was printed on University’s letterhead and individually signed by both 
researchers. Business reply envelopes for responses were printed and provided to give 
a professional look. To reward the contact persons, they were given the option of 
receiving a copy of the research results.  
 
3.3.1 The Sample 
The survey instruments were distributed to 580 business contacts in Singapore. 
The majority of the sampled managers worked in organizations registered in the 
Singapore 1000 database. Phone calls were made to individual companies to verify 
that the contact persons still worked there and that the mailing addresses and 
designations were correct. Depending on the size of the organization, at least two 
surveys were distributed to each organization.  
The contact persons were requested to distribute the surveys to colleagues in 
middle or senior level management positions, who had subordinates and who had 
decision making power in initiating policies or changes. If the contact person matched 








16882 surveys were mailed to 580 organizations at end April 2002. Three 
weeks after the surveys were mailed out, phone calls were made to all the companies 
to check on the status of the surveys. To ensure respondents’ anonymity, the surveys 
were not coded to track the organizational response rates. In late May 2002, follow-up 
letters and surveys were sent to contact persons who indicated they had not received 
the surveys but were willing to participate. They were also sent to contacts who could 
not be reached by phone, to remind them to distribute the surveys if they had not 
already done so. 
 
3.3.3 Response Rates 
A total of 233 surveys was returned, yielding a response rate of 13.8%. The low 
response rate could be attributed to the sensitive nature of the research topic (Randall 
& Gibson, 1991). Hence, potential respondents may not have been willing to have 
their intentions measured directly. A manager called to say that she did not wish to 
participate in the survey because she “felt uncomfortable”, even though anonymity 
was assured. Another reason could be the widespread occurrence of retrenchment 
exercises in the past two years. At least three contact persons were unwilling to 
distribute the surveys because their organizations had just undergone retrenchment or 
                                                 
2 2088 surveys were mailed out in the first round of administration. However, each contact person who refused to 
assist us was represented by one lost response, rather than the number of surveys sent to him/her. That was done 
because it was the contact person who had rejected our request and not the potential respondents to the surveys 
(who could  have responded to us). People who indicated they did not receive the surveys and were willing to assist 
were represented by the two surveys sent to them in the follow-up round rather than based on   the original number 
of surveys sent out to them to which  they did not receive.    




were in the process of doing so. According to one contact, the retrenchment vignette 
could arouse suspicion and lower the morale of participating managers. Other 
researchers such as Jobber and Mirza (1991), who conducted a cross-national study of 
response rates, have also noted that the response rates from Singapore, Malaysia and 
Thailand tend to be lower, around 10%.   
 
3.3.4  Respondents’ Profiles  
Of the 233 responses returned, 204 responses were useable for data analyses. 
Of this number, 87.8% of the respondents were either mid-level or senior level 
managers who held company titles such as “managers”, “senior managers”, “general 
managers”, “directors” or “vice-presidents”. Males made up 58.8% of the respondents. 
The majority  (95.1%) of the respondents were Chinese and more than 81% of the 
respondents were Singaporeans. More than 94% of the respondents were at least 31 
years of age, with the modal age group of 41 to 45 years old (26.5%). Degree holders 
and post-graduate degree holders made up 51.5% and 28.9% of the respondents 
respectively. Slightly more than 91% of the respondents had at least 6 years of work 
experience and more than 39% of the respondents earned more than $100, 000 per 
annum. In terms of religion, Christians formed the largest group (47.1%), followed by 
Buddhists (24.5%) and those with no religion (19.6%). More than 55% of the 
respondents worked in the manufacturing (22.5%), information technology (9.3%), 
finance-related (8.8%), electronics (8.3%) and construction (6.9%) industries.  
Appendix C displays the respondents’ profiles.  
 
 




3.3.5 Organizational Policy on Electronic Monitoring and Managers’ Past 
Experience with Retrenchment 
The respondents were asked whether their organizations had policies that 
prohibited the use of electronic monitoring.  About 25% of the respondents were not 
aware whether they had such a policy and only 1.5% indicated they had organizational 
policies that prohibited the use of electronic monitoring (see Appendix D). More than 
70% of the respondents indicated that they did not have organizational polices that 
restricted the use of electronic monitoring. When asked whether their organizations 
used electronic monitoring systems on their employees, about 21% answered 
positively while about 59% did not think their organizations used electronic 
monitoring on employees. Another 10% did not know.  
After answering the questions to the retrenchment vignette, the respondents 
were asked whether they had ever experienced retrenchment exercises in any of the 
organizations they worked with in the past. If they answered positively, they were also 
asked to indicate whether they felt that the retrenchment exercise was handled well. 
More than 66% of the respondents had past experiences of retrenchment exercises and 
of this number, more than 70% felt that the retrenchment exercises were handled well 
(see Appendix D).  
 
3.3.6 Measures 
The measures used in the survey are as follow: 
 
Behavioral intention 
On a 7-point scale, respondents were asked to indicate their behavioral 




intentions in response to the vignettes. “I intend to use electronic monitoring3” (1 = 
Strongly agree and 7 = Strongly disagree)4. Following this measure, respondents had 
to explain their reasons for their choices by answering an open-ended question.  
Using a single-item approach to measure behavioral intentions has some clear 
advantages. Researchers who used single-item measures in job satisfaction studies 
found them to be more robust than multi-item scales (Wanous, Reichers, and Hudy 
(1997). Others found that results derived from using the single-item approach were 
comparable to the multi-item approach (e.g. Nagy, 2002). According to Sackett and 
Larson (1990), a single-item measure is sufficient if the construct measured is narrow 
or apparent to the respondent. The single-item measure for intention appears to have 
relatively high face validity (Wanous et al., 1997). In the first pre-test, we used four 
items to measure intentions. In the second pre-test, we scaled down to two items. In 
both pre-tests, some respondents had expressed puzzlement or displeasure that the 
different items used to measure intentions were redundant as they were very similar. 
In addition, a non-psychometric advantage of using single-item measure is that it 
saves limited space on our questionnaire (Wanous et al., 1997). Eventually, we 
decided to use only one item to measure intentions as it was sufficiently 
straightforward to the respondent.  
 
Attitude towards the behavior 
Three items on a 7-point semantic differential scale were used to measure the 
individuals’ attitudes toward the behavior in question. An example was “On the 
whole, using electronic monitoring is undesirable-desirable”. The alpha for the 
                                                 
3 The phrase “use electronic monitoring” is replaced with “retrench the five employees” for the questions in the  
  retrenchment scenario. 
4 All items, except for perceived control and attitude variables, were rated on strongly agree – strongly disagree  
  scales where 1 =  Strongly agree and 7 = Strongly disagree. 




retrenchment scenario (αr) was 0.878 and the alpha for the electronic monitoring 
scenario (αem) was 0.9485.  
 
Subjective norms 
The respondents were asked to list and rank up to three organizational persons 
who were likely to influence their decisions in response to the vignettes. They were 
then asked to rate two subjective norm items on a 7-point response format. The two 
items they rated were “The organizational person(s) I listed above would think that I 
should use electronic monitoring” and “The organizational person(s) I listed above 
would encourage me to use electronic monitoring” (αr = 0.931, αem = 0.970).  
 
Perceived behavioral control  
Three set of items were used to measure three dimensions of perceived 
behavior control: perceived control, self-efficacy and perceived worth of effort. 
Perceived Control. Three items adapted from Ajzen & Madden (1986) were 
used to measure perceived control. The items were measured on a 7-point rating scale. 
An example of one such item was “For me to use electronic monitoring would be 
easy-difficult” (αr = 0.663, αem = 0.751). 
Self-efficacy. Two items adapted from Flannery & May (2000) were used to 
measure the respondent’s self-efficacy in making the decisions posed by the scenarios. 
The two items were “My past experiences in life increase my confidence that I am 
qualified to make a decision concerning the use of  electronic monitoring” and “I feel 
confident that my skills, abilities and knowledge qualify me to make a decision  
concerning the use of electronic monitoring” (αr = 0.854, αem = 0.934 ). 
                                                 
5 r and em represent the statistics for the retrenchment and electronic  monitoring scenario respectively. 




Perceived worth of effort. We used two items to explore the possible effects of 
this variable. They were “It will probably take too much of my effort to use electronic 
monitoring” (reverse coded) and “It is worth my time and energy to use electronic 
monitoring”. The items did not have satisfactory Cronbach alpha’s ratings in both 
scenarios. We would examine whether both items loaded under the same factor in the 
following chapter.  
 
Attribution to causes of behavior 
Respondents were asked to select the factors that influenced their decision to 
use electronic monitoring or retrench the employees. The three options given were 
ability, control over the decision and whether it was worth their efforts to engage in 
the particular decision. They could choose any, all or none of the options. 
 
Recognition of ethical issue 
To measure the extent to which respondents recognized the presence of an 
ethical issue, the respondents were asked to rate on a 7-point scale to the statement, 
“There is an ethical issue in the scenario on electronic monitoring”. 
 
Accountability pressures and presence of legitimate authority’s directive 
Accountability to affected parties and presence of legitimate authority’s 
directive were manipulated as four conditions in each scenario. The four conditions 
were high accountability, low accountability, presence of authority and absence of 
authority. Slightly different versions of the surveys, reflecting the different conditions, 
were randomly allocated to the organizations (see Appendix A). For instance, in the 




presence of authority condition, the retrenchment scenario was written as follows: 
 
 
This morning, you received the following memorandum from your 
company’s CEO: 
 
“Given falling business demand and the recent economic slowdown, it is 
becoming very costly for the organization to maintain all its current business 
units. The changing market trends have also inevitably made some of our 
business units redundant. There is a pressing need to concentrate on our 
core businesses to ensure the organization’s survival and growth.  
 
As you know, a restructuring team was formed to streamline work processes 
and phase out business units. I have endorsed their proposals and given 
them the mandate to proceed with the measures. These measures include 
closure of some business units and retrenchment of employees. Give your 
assistance to the team in administering the necessary changes. It is a painful 
decision but I ask for your cooperation and support during this transition.” 
 
Attached to the memorandum is a list of proposed measures, which includes 
a list of executives from your business unit selected for retrenchment. You 
noticed that five of the staff on the list have been working with the 
organization for more than twenty years and are a few months away from 
retirement. According to company’s policy, these five staff will receive a hefty 
sum of money upon retirement. However, if they are terminated before 
retirement age, they will lose the entire retirement fund. Although these 
retrenched staff will get a severance package, the amount is only a fraction of 
their retirement fund.  
 
In terms of performance and skills, these five employees are comparable to 
some of their more junior counterparts, who have been transferred rather 
than retrenched. The reason is clear: the high costs incurred from the 
salaries and retirement fund of these senior staff are a burden to the 
organization.  
 
You have to make the decision: Do you intend to retrench the five employees 
who are near their retirement age? 
 
In the absence of authority condition, the first few paragraphs were slightly 
different in content but the rest of the text was the same for all the conditions: 
Because of falling business demand and the recent economic slowdown, it is 
becoming very costly for the organization where you work to maintain all its 
current business units. The changing market trends have also inevitably 
made some business units redundant. There is a pressing need for your 
organization to concentrate on its core businesses to ensure survival and 
growth. 
 
A restructuring team was formed to streamline work processes and phase out 
business units in your organization. The restructuring team has just sent all 
the managers a list of proposed measures.  If you have no objections to their 
proposed measures, you can proceed to implement them. 
 
The proposal includes a list of executives from your business unit selected for 
retrenchment…(same information for the rest of the text). 




It is possible that respondents presented with the low accountability condition 
experiences a latent form of justification pressures. However, Huber & Seiser’s (2001) 
study has shown that latent justification pressure assumed in some decision theories 
does not have the same effect as an explicit justification pressure. To check for this 
possibility, there was a question to verify whether the condition had been manipulated 
correctly. An example of one manipulation check question is shown in the next 
section. 
 
Controls and checks 
Past studies have found mixed results concerning the relations between 
demographic variables such as age, years of education, length of employment, and 
respondents’ ethical beliefs and decision making behavior (Ford & Richardson, 1994). 
As such, the respondents’ educational qualifications and length of employment were 
used as control variables in the data analysis. Age was not included as a control 
because it correlated highly with length of employment. Hence, the latter was also 
used as a proxy control variable for age.  
To control for order effects arising from the sequence of the scenarios, the 
order of the scenarios and the questions that followed them were switched in half of 
the surveys sent to the contact persons.  
Manipulation checks were included in all the surveys. For instance, in the high 
accountability condition, respondents were asked to rate on a 7-point scale (where 1 = 
Strongly Agree and 7 = Strongly Disagree) on how strongly they agreed or disagreed 
with the statement, “It is clear that you have to explain and justify your decision to the 
five employees if you intend to retrench them”.  




3.3.7 Test for Non-response Bias 
To check for non-response bias, we compared demographic profiles of 
managers who responded to the first round of survey administration and those who 
responded only after follow-up steps were taken (Fowler, 1988). Statistically, the two 
groups did not differ in terms of gender (χ2 = 1.059, p = 0.303), race (χ2  = 0.995, p = 
0.319), nationality (χ2  = 1.896, p = 0.387), length of employment (χ2  = 3.437, p = 
0.633), educational qualifications (χ2  = 0.087, p = 0.993), annual income (χ2  = 6.695, 
p = 0.153) and organizational position (χ2 = 2.184, p = 0.702). The two groups 
differed slightly in terms of religion (χ2  = 12.880, p = 0.012). The next chapter details 
the results and data analysis of the responses.  
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4.1 Preliminary Data Screening 
The explore statistics command in SPSS was used to screen the data collected 
for both vignettes. The Kolgomorov-Smirnov test rejected the hypothesis of normality 
for the distribution for behavioral intentions. However, the normal Q-Q plots showed 
that violations of normality did not appear to be serious. The Levene test for equality 
of group variances did not reject the hypothesis of equal variances for data from both 
scenarios at α = 0.05 (F = 1.361, p = 0.256 for electronic monitoring and F = 1.415, p 
= 0.240 for retrenchment). Appropriate transformations were made on the data from 
both vignettes (SPSS Base 10.0 Applications Guide, 1999). However, there was no 
improvement in the test statistics or graphical displays for the transformed data from 
both scenarios. That being the case, no transformation was performed on the data. 
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The means, median, standard deviations and correlations of the independent 
and dependent variables for the two scenarios are displayed in Table 1 & 2. The 
median statistics were also computed as they were insensitive to violations of the 
assumption of normality (SPSS Base 10.0 Applications Guide, 1999: 21).  
In general, business managers in the sample were more inclined to disagree 
with intentions to use electronic monitoring systems and retrench the employees in the 
respective vignettes (medianem = 6.00 and em = 4.59, medianr = 5.50 and r = 4.89). 
Consistent with their intentions, these managers held negative attitudes toward using 
electronic monitoring and retrenching the employees (medianem =  3.00 and em = - 
1.81, medianr = 3.00 and r = 2.17). Compared to their intentions, they tended to 
agree that organizational referent others would encourage them to use electronic 
monitoring and retrench the employees (medianem = 4.00 and em = 4.06, medianr = 
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4.00 and r = 3.73). The respondents perceived moderate or little control in making 
the final decisions (medianem = 3.67 and em = 3.82, medianr = 4.67 and r = 4.47). 
However, they felt they had the ability, skills and experience to make the decisions 
concerning the use of electronic monitoring and retrenchment of employees  
(medianem = 2.00 and em = 2.64, medianr = 2.50 and r = 2.85). In addition, they 
seemed to be relatively neutral about perceived worth of efforts (medianem = 4.00 and 
em = 4.21, medianr = 4.00 and r = 4.13). Both scenarios were deliberately designed 
as strong situations. This was supported by the low scores for “recognition of ethical 
issue” item, which indicated the respondents recognized the presence of ethical issues 
in both vignettes (medianem = 2.00 and em = 2.32, medianr = 2.00 and r = 2.38).  
To examine the relations between the variables, bi-variate correlations were 
computed for the independent and dependent variables. To reduce the risk of making a 
Type-One error, Bonferroni adjustments were made for the α levels. With the 
exception of self-efficacy, all correlations between the dependent variable and the 
independent variables were significant at α = 0.01 for the electronic monitoring 
vignette. Similarly, attitude, subjective norms, perceived worth of effort and 
recognition of ethical issue were strongly correlated with behavioral intentions for the 
retrenchment vignette (α = 0.01). Self-efficacy and perceived control’s correlations 
with intentions were not significant at α = 0.05.  
 
4.3 Manipulation Checks for the Moderators 
The moderators, high versus low accountability, presence versus absence of 
authority’s directive, were manipulated as four conditions for each scenario. On a 
scale where 1 = Strongly agree and 7 = Strongly disagree, respondents were asked to 
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rate their extent of agreement with the manipulated condition. A lower score indicates 
that the manipulation has been interpreted as planned. 
The average mean scores for the manipulation check questions were near the 
mid-range. For electronic monitoring, the mean scores were 3.21 and 2.90 for the 
accountability and authority conditions respectively. For retrenchment, the mean 
scores were 3.59 and 3.01 for the accountability and authority conditions respectively. 
Although all the scores were below 4, the middle score, the manipulated conditions 
might not have successfully achieved the intended effects. 
If not all the manipulations had worked as designed, we would need to conduct 
additional analyses to test for the interaction effects. First, we will test for the 
influence of the moderators based on the codes assigned to the manipulated 
conditions, 1 or 0. Then we will also test the interaction effects based on respondents’ 
perceptions of the situations. We will treat managers’ responses to the manipulation 
checks as proxy for their perceived accountability to employees and perceived 
pressures to obey authorities’ instructions. This method will categorize the 
respondents according to their perceptions of the situations correctly even if there was 
manipulation failure.   
 
4.4 Factor Analysis 
The Kaiser Meyer Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity showed that it was appropriate to use factor analysis. The common 
factor analysis with varimax rotation was performed on the independent variable items 
in the survey to assess their underlying structure (Darlington, 1997). The number of 
factors generated and retained were based on their eigen values and scree plot 
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criterion. Factors with eigen values greater than one were retained. The results6 
showed that the items loaded on the appropriate factors for the data from the 
electronic monitoring vignette, with the exception of subjective norms and attitude. 
Contrary to past research analyses, the attitude and subjective norm items loaded on 
the same factor (see Table 3). As expected, all the items loaded on the predicted factor 
structure for the data from the retrenchment vignette (see Table 4).  
 
4.5 Attribution of Causes for Behavioral Intentions 
When asked for their opinion on the likely causes for their choice of behavior 
to use electronic monitoring, 34.8% of the respondents attributed the cause of their 
behavioral intentions to their ability (experience, skills) in dealing with the decision. 
Forty-nine percent of the respondents attributed the cause of their decision to their 
perceived control over the behavior while 55.9% of the respondents attributed it to 
perceived worth of efforts to engage in the action. These results were consistent with 
the correlation statistics, where perceived control and perceived worth of effort were 
strongly correlated with intentions.  
In the retrenchment scenario, the majority (68.6%) of the respondents chose 
perceived control as one of the causes that influenced their choices. Conversely, most 
people did not attribute the causes of their behavior to ability (60.6%) or perceived 
worth of effort (62.3%) in this vignette. These findings only partially supported the 
quantitative results (see Appendix E).  
                                                 
6 An item used to measure perceived worth of effort was removed as it had unclear factor loadings. The other item 
used to measure the same variable loaded on the same factor as the items used to measure perceived control. 
However, its addition to the variable lowered the overall alpha ratings for perceived control so it was also removed 
from the final analysis. 
    
TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (Electronic monitoring ) 
 
 Variable Mean Median Std. 
Deviation
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Behavioral intentions 4.59 6.00 2.13       
2 Attitude       1.81       3.00 5.56   .76**      
3 Subjective norms 4.06 4.00 1.81   .64**   .62**     
4 Perceived control 3.82 3.67 1.49   .41**   .42** .25**    
5 Self-efficacy 2.64 2.00 1.24      .02     -.06    -.07  .27**   
6 Perceived worth of efforts 4.21 4.00 1.31  .62**   .63** .51**  .40** .07  
7 Recognition of ethical Issue 2.32 2.00 1.48 -.52**  -.58**    -.37** -.44**     -.00 -.45** 
8 Accountability pressures 3.21 2.00 2.16 - - - - - - 
9 Authority’s directive 2.90 2.00 1.62 - - - - - - 
Item 1 to 7: N = 196 – 204 for means, median & standard deviation (due to pairwise deletion of cases) 
Item 1 to 7: N = 192 for correlations (due to listwise deletion of cases) 
 
TABLE 2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (Retrenchment ) 
 
 Variable Mean Median Std. 
Deviation
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Behavioral Intentions 4.88 5.50 1.74       
2 Attitude       2.17       3.00 4.28  .63**      
3 Subjective Norms 3.73 4.00 1.69 .40**   .32**     
4 Perceived control 4.47 4.67 1.22     .08      .08      -.04    
5 Self-efficacy 2.85 2.50 1.37    -.00     -.01  .09 .33**   
6 Perceived worth of efforts 4.13 4.00 1.02 .39**   .42**  .10 .26** .14  
7 Recognition of ethical Issue 2.38 2.00 1.37 -.34**   -.31** -.01    -.17 .11 -.21* 
8 Accountability pressures 3.59 3.00 2.24 - - - - - - 
9 Authority’s directive 3.01 3.00 1.71 - - - - - - 
Item 1 to 7: N = 198 – 203 for means, median & standard deviation (due to pairwise deletion of cases) 
Item 1 to 7: N = 194 for correlations (due to listwise deletion of cases) 
Item 8 & 9: Manipulation check scores for Accountability Pressures and Presence of Authority’s directive 
*     p < 0.05  
**   p < 0.01   - Bonferroni adjustments made for all correlation statistics ( p < 0.00048 **, p < 0.00238*) 
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Item 1 2 3 
Attitude1 .842  -.303 
Attitude3 .839  -.253 
Subjective Norm1 -.830   
Subjective Norm2 -.823   
Attitude2 .820  -.291 
PBC_self-efficacy1  .931  
PBC_self-efficacy2  .908 .232 
PBC_control3   .777 
PBC_control2   .652 
PBC_control1 -.428  .636 
 





Item 1 2 3 4 
Attitude3 .869    
Attitude1 .852    
Attitude2 .789    
Subjective Norm1  .936   
Subjective Norm2 -.217 .897   
PBC_self-efficacy1   .866 .256 
PBC_self-efficacy2   .849 .244 
PBC_control1 -.213   .624 
PBC_control3   .252 .599 
PBC_control2    .563 
. 
Note: Factor loadings less than 0.20 in absolute values are not displayed in the tables. 
 
4.6 Regression Analysis 
Multiple regression analysis was employed to assess how well the outcome 
variable could be explained by the current predictors and to identify a parsimonious 
predictive model for the study. Specifically, hierarchical regression analysis was used 
for this study. 
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Prior to performing the regression on the data, scatterplots were generated to 
explore the nature of the relation between the predictors and the outcome variable. 
This was used to identify outliers that might have distorted the results and to check 
whether a higher order variable or non-linear relation existed between the predictor 
and outcome variables. Self-efficacy and perceived control did not show strong 
associations with intentions in the bi-variate scatter-plots. Consistent with the 
correlation statistics, this could indicate that these two variables will not contribute 
significantly to explaining the variance in intentions.  
Two procedures were also applied to detect the presence of multicollinearity. 
Since none of the bi-variate correlations amongst the predictors exceeded 0.70 
(Tabachnik & Fidell, 1989) and the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) of all the predictor 
variables from both vignettes were below 2.50 (Graybill & Iyer, 1994), 
multicollinearity did not appear to be a problem for our data. 
 
4.6.1 Hierarchical Regression Analysis: Data from Electronic Monitoring 
Vignette 
The variables were entered into the regression equation in four steps. First, we 
entered the three control variables, education level, length of employment and 
recognition of ethical issue. The effects of recognition of ethical issue variable had to 
be taken into account as it had relatively high correlations with behavioral intentions. 
Then, attitude and subjective norms were entered. Finally, perceived control and self-
efficacy were entered into the model. Attitude and subjective norms were entered first 
as they were considered the more stable variables in the theory of planned behavior so 
their potential contribution to the model should be accounted for before other 
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variables. Nonetheless, additional analyses would be conducted to determine whether 
the order of entry affected the role of the variables in the model. 
TABLE 5: Hierarchical Regression Analysis Model (Electronic Monitoring) 
Step Variables R R2 Adj. 
R2 
S.E. ∆R2 ∆F df Sig. 
F ∆ 
1 Education level 
Length of employment 
Recognition of ethical issue 
.44 .20 .18 1.93 .20 14.54 3, 178 .00**
2 Attitude 
Subjective Norms 
.83 .69 .68 1.21 .49 136.92 2, 176 .00**
3 Perceived Control 
Self-efficacy 
.83 .69 .68 1.21 .01 1.72 2, 174    .18 
*     p < 0.05  
**   p < 0.01     
 
The F-statistics for the change in adjusted R-square for models 1 and 2 are 
significant at α = 0.01 level. From the adjusted R-square for the models, it is clear that 
model 2 has the higher adjusted R-square relative to model 1. That is, the predictors in 
model 2 explain a greater percentage of variance (68%) in the outcome variable than 
the variables in model 1, which explains only 18% of the variance in behavioral 
intentions. 
The overall F-statistics for model 2 is significant at α = 0.01 (F = 76.81, p = 
0.00). Therefore, there is sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the β 
coefficients (attitude and subjective norms) in the regression model are zero. The 
corresponding t-statistics show that attitude and subjective norms are significant 
predictors of intentions at α = 0.01 (Table 6). Hence, there is sufficient evidence to 
reject the hypothesis that the β coefficients of attitude and subjective norms are zero. 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are supported by the data from electronic monitoring vignette. 
Consistent with their correlation statistics and bi-variate plots with intentions, self-
efficacy and perceived control are not significant predictors of the outcome variable. 
Hypothesis 3a is not supported. 
CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS AND DATA ANALYSIS 
 59
 
TABLE 6: T-statistics & β Coefficients 
 
Model Variables B S. E. β t Sig. 
(Constant) 2.50 .43  5.86    .00 
Education level .10 .11  .04 .93    .36 
Length of employment 0.03 .07  .02 .52    .61 
Recognition of Ethical Issue 0.07 .07     -.05 -1.0    .31 
Attitude -.22 .02 -.58 -9.38 .00 ** 
2 
Subjective Norms .36 .07  .30 5.39 .00 ** 
     *     p < 0.05  
     **   p < 0.01     
 
4.6.2 Hierarchical Regression Analysis: Data from Retrenchment Vignette 
In the same manner, we followed the earlier steps taken for the hierarchical 
regression analysis for the data collected on the retrenchment vignette.  
TABLE 7: Hierarchical Regression Analysis Model (Retrenchment) 
Step Variables R R2 Adj. 
R2 
S.E. ∆R2 ∆F df Sig. 
F ∆ 
1 Education level 
Length of employment 
Recognition of ethical issue 
.33 .11 .09 1.68 .11 7.24 3, 181 .00** 
2 Attitude 
Subjective Norms 
.69 .48 .47 1.29 .37 64.61 2, 179 .00** 
3 Perceived Control 
Self-efficacy 
.70 .49 .47 1.29 .00 .63 2, 177    .53 
*     p < 0.05  
**   p < 0.01     
 
The F-statistics for the change in adjusted R-square for models 1 and 2 are 
significant at α = 0.01. From the adjusted R-square for the models, model 2 displays a 
higher adjusted R-square relative to model 1. The predictors in model 2 explain a 
greater percentage of variance (47%) in the outcome variable as compared to the 
variables in model 1 (9%).  
The overall F-statistics for model 2 is significant at α = 0.01 (F = 33.25, p = 
0.00). Therefore, there is sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the β 
coefficients in the regression models are zero. We shall examine the model’s 
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individual β coefficients, their corresponding t-statistics and p-value to determine the 
influence of individual predictors on the respondents’ behavioral intentions. 
TABLE 8: T-statistics & β Coefficients 
 
 Model  B S. E. β t Sig. 
(Constant) 4.12 .40  10.25    .00 
Education level -.17 .12 -.08 -1.41    .16 
Length of employment 0.05 .07  .04 .77    .44 
Recognition of Ethical Issue -.19 .07 -.15 -2.65 .01* 
Attitude -.22 .03 -.52 -8.76 .00** 
2 
Subjective Norms  .23 .06  .22 3.89 .00** 
        *     p < 0.05  
          **   p < 0.01     
 
 
The t-statistics show that attitude, subjective norms and recognition of ethical 
issue are significant predictors of behavioral intentions at α = 0.01. Hence, there is 
sufficient evidence to reject the hypothesis that β coefficients of attitude and 
subjective norms are zero. Consistent with the data from the electronic monitoring 
vignette, Hypotheses 1 and 2 are supported by the data from the retrenchment 
vignette. Supporting the correlation statistics and bi-variate plots with intentions, both 
self-efficacy and perceived control are not significant predictors of the outcome 
variable. Hence, Hypothesis 3b is not supported for the retrenchment vignette. 
In summary, the regression equations for both vignettes can be summarized as 
follow: 
Y = 2.50 – 0.22X1 + 0.36X2 + ε   (for electronic monitoring vignette) 
Y = 4.12 – 0.22X1 + 0.23X2 + ε   (for retrenchment vignette) 
where  X1   = attitude, X2  = subjective norms and ε    = error terms 
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4.6.3 Additional Analyses 
To verify whether the sequence of entry of the variables affected the regression 
results, perceived control and self-efficacy were entered as a block before attitude and 
subjective norms were entered into the equations.  
Entered as a block with self-efficacy, perceived control was significant in 
explaining behavioral intentions to use electronic monitoring when it was entered into 
the equation before attitude and subjective norms were included (F = 9.73, pF = 0.00,  
t = 4.135, pt = 0.00) However, the subsequent addition of attitude and subjective 
norms increased the variances of intentions significantly (F = 117.19, p = 0.00) and 
also caused the effects of perceived control to become insignificant (pt = 5.07). Self-
efficacy did not contribute unique variance to explaining intentions, regardless of its 
order of entry in the regression equation. 
Both perceived control and self-efficacy did not contribute significant unique 
variance to the model for the retrenchment scenario (F = 1.79, p = 1.70). On the other 
hand, attitude and subjective norms contributed significant variance in explaining 
intentions (F = 61.97, p = 0.00) even after perceived control and self-efficacy were 
accounted for in the equation. 
Hence, the unique variance contributed by the addition of attitude and 
subjective norms could not be attributed to the sequence in which the variables were 
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4.6.4 Moderated Hierarchical Regression: Accountability Pressures and 
Presence of Legitimate Authority’s Directive 
Moderated hierarchical regression was used to detect the effects of the two 
moderators, accountability pressures and authority’s directive, on the model. Prior to 
multiplying the moderator and the predictor, the data for the independent variables 
were centered so as to reduce the effects of multicollinearity between interaction terms 
and predictor variables (Aiken & West, 1991). The analyses of the two moderators are 
examined separately.  
 
4.6.4.1 The influence of accountability’s pressures on the theory of planned 
behavior 
Prior to performing the regression, the accountability variable was coded 1 for 
high accountability and coded 0 for low accountability. The control variables were 
entered into the regression equation in the first step, the predictor variables in the 
second and third steps, the moderator in the fourth step and the interaction terms in the 
final step. Accountability pressures did not have a main effect on intentions to use 
electronic monitoring (∆R2 = 0.01, ∆F = 2.58, p = 0.11) or to retrench employees (∆R2 
= 0.02, ∆F = 0.70, p = 0.59) at α = 0.05. Similarly, it did not have a moderating effect 
on the relations between the predictors and the outcome variable for the electronic 
monitoring (∆R2 = 0.00, ∆F = 0.19, p = 0.94) and retrenchment vignettes (∆R2 = 0.07, 
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4.6.4.2 The influence of presence of legitimate authority’s directive on the theory of 
planned behavior 
To analyze the main and interaction effects of legitimate authority’s directive 
on the theory of planned behavior, the moderator variable was coded 3 for presence of 
authority condition and coded 4 for absence of authority condition. The control 
variables were entered into the regression equation in the first step, the predictor 
variables in the second and third step, the moderator in the fourth step and the 
interaction terms in the final step. The moderating variable did not have a main effect 
on behavioral intentions to use electronic monitoring (∆R2 = 0.00, ∆F = 0.54, p = 
0.47) at α = 0.05. Neither did it interact with the predictors to influence the dependent 
variable (∆R2 = 0.01, ∆F = 0.67, p = 0.61). The results of the hierarchical regression 
have been tabulated in Table F3 in Appendix F.  
The moderating variable has main effects on behavioral intentions to retrench 
the employees. The F-change statistics for the model that included the moderating 
variable was significant at α = 0.05 (see Model 4 from Table 9). The addition of the 
moderating variable increased the R-square by 3 percent. There was a mild interaction 
effect between the moderating variables and the predictors at α = 0.10 (p = 0.07). The 
addition of the interaction terms increased the R-square by 4 percent (see Model 5). 
The coefficients of the variables in Model 5 are tabulated in Appendix F (see Table 
F4). At the pre-determined α = 0.05, there is sufficient evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis that the β coefficients in the regression model 4 are zero. The t-statistics 
for attitude, subjective norm and the moderator indicate that these three variables 
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TABLE 9: Moderated Hierarchical Regression Analysis ( (Retrenchment) 
 
Step  R R2 Adj. 
R2 
S.E. ∆R2 ∆F df Sig. 
F ∆ 
1 Education level 
Length of employment 
Recognition of ethical issue 
.38 .15 .12 1.63 .15 5.69 3, 99 .00**
2 Attitude 
Subjective Norms 
.70 .49 .47 1.27 .35 33.09 2, 97 .00**
3 Perceived Control 
Self-efficacy 
.70 .50 .46 1.28 .00 .29 2, 95    .75 
4 Authority .72 .52 
 
.48 1.25 .03 5.20 1, 94    .03* 
5 Attitude x Authority 
Subjective Norms x Authority 
Perceived Control x Authority
Self-efficacy x Authority 
.75 .57 .51 1.22 .04 2.30 4, 90    .07≅ 
≅      p < 0.10  
*      p < 0.05  
**    p < 0.01     
 
TABLE 10: T-statistics & β Coefficients 
 Model  B S. E. β t Sig. 
(Constant) 7.34 1.05  7.02     .00 
Education -.13 .17     -.06 -.77     .44 
Length of employment  .03 .10 .03  .31     .76 
Recognition of Ethical Issue  -.14 .11     -.10    -1.25     .21 
Attitude  -.19 .04     -.44    -5.26 .00** 
Subjective Norm   .32 .08 .31 3.86 .00** 
Perceived Control   .08 .11 .06  .72     .47 
Self Efficacy  -.01 .11     -.01  -.11     .91 
4 
Moderator  -.60 .26     -.17 -2.28 .03* 
  *      p < 0.05  
  **    p < 0.01     
 
To investigate the direction of the influence, an independent sample t-test was 
computed for the data from the absence of authority (AA) and presence of authority 
(PA) conditions. The mean statistics of the behavioral intentions from the AA group 
was 5.08 while that from PA group was 4.29. The difference in mean scores of 
behavioral intentions in the two groups was statistically significant (p = 0.018). That 
indicated that respondents in the PA group were more likely to agree with intentions 
to retrench the employees in the presence of legitimate authority’s directive, as 
compared to those in the AA group.  
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4.6.4.3 Further Analyses of Moderators 
The moderators did not show significant results and one possible reason could 
be because the manipulation of the scenarios did not work as intended. Instead of 
coding the scenarios as 1 or 0 and treating the moderators as dichotomous variables, 
we used managers’ responses to the manipulation check questions to categorize their 
perceived need for accountability or perceived pressures to obey authority’s directives. 
For instance, the managers’ extent of agreement or disagreement with the statement 
“It is clear that no one has directed you to use electronic monitoring” will indicate 
whether they sensed the pressure to obey authority. By treating the manipulation 
checks as predictors of behavioral intentions and moderators of our model, we are 
trying to capture managers’ perceptions of the scenarios, rather than use the coded 
scenarios as moderators. 
 Using the continuous variables as moderators in the regression equations did 
not change the results significantly. In the electronic monitoring scenario, 
accountability pressures did not contribute main effects (F = 1.26, p = 0.27) or 
interaction effects to our model (F = 1.37, p = 0.25). Similarly, obedience to 
authority’s directive did not surface as a significant predictor (F = 0.50, p = 0.48) or 
moderator (F = 0.98, p = 0.43).  
Perceived accountability to affected parties was not a significant predictor (F = 
2.76, p = 1.01) or moderator (F = 2.33, p = 0.07) of the relations within our proposed 
model for the retrenchment scenario. Perceived pressure to obey authority was a 
significant predictor of intentions to retrench employees, (F = 8.35, p = 0.01), 
supporting the results obtained in Table 9. It was not a significant moderator of the 
relations within our proposed model for the retrenchment decision (F = 4.08, p = 
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0.80). Hence, the insignificant results of the moderators could not be attributed to 
manipulation failure. 
4.7 Responses to Open-ended Questions 
After respondents had rated their intentions to engage in a particular behavior, 
they were asked to explain their choices in an open-ended manner. Of the responses 
provided, 185 (90.7%) responses to the electronic monitoring scenario and 183 
(89.7%) responses to the retrenchment vignette could be coded.  
The open-ended responses were content analyzed. The codes were based on 
literature on ethics, electronic monitoring, and retrenchment. The codes were tested on 
half of the responses provided. Codes that were infrequently used were removed or re-
classified into broader categories and new codes were added to capture information 
unaccounted for by previous classifications. To increase the reliability of the coding, 
the researcher recoded the responses a second time and compared them to the earlier 
material coded (Stempel, 1989). The list of codes and their meanings are shown in 
Appendix G.   
 
4.7.1 Choices Made by Respondents 
The respondents were categorized into three main groups, those who agreed 
(AGREE), those who disagreed (DISAGREE) and those who were neutral 
(NEUTRAL) to the use of electronic monitoring or the retrenchment of employees. 
Using this coding system, 37.3% of the respondents agreed to use electronic 
monitoring at the workplace, 1.6% were neutral and 61.1% disagreed to use it. For the 
retrenchment decision, the majority of the respondents disagreed to retrench the 
employees (66.7%) while 24.0% agreed to retrench and 9.3% of them were neutral 
(see Appendix H).  
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4.7.2 Conditions that Influenced Respondents’ Choices 
Some respondents indicated they would only take a particular course of action 
under certain conditions. That was represented by the main code, “CONDITION”. 
The conditions were sub-coded. The frequency of the conditions coded are charted in 
Appendix H. Below are excerpts of some quotes made by respondents categorized 
under their respective sub-codes.  
 
4.7.2.1 Electronic monitoring 
Of the 69 respondents who agreed to use electronic monitoring, 14.5% would 
do so only if the employees were informed prior to its implementation (CON-
INFORM). One respondent said, “… I will choose to let them know beforehand that 
the phones are tapped and videos are installed so that they are aware. It is fairer to 
them so that they can make alternative arrangements (i.e. use hand phone when 
answering their phone calls” (Ref: 120).  
 
4.7.2.2 Retrenchment 
Of the 122 persons who disagreed to retrench the employees, 7.4% would do 
so only if the employees were poor performers (CON-PERFORMANCE).  Another 3 
persons (2.5%) quoted other conditions (CON-OTHERS), such as the legality of the 
decision, “Legal advice should be sought before such action (retrenchment) is taken” 
(Ref: 4). Seventeen respondents were neutral towards retrenching the employees. Of 
these, 5 persons (29.4%) would retrench only if the employees could no longer 
contribute to the organization, were poor performers or had bad attitude (CON-
PERFORMANCE). One respondent said, “…if the performance is really below 
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expectations and attempts to deal with it have been made, then it would seem fair to 
go ahead with the retrenchment” (Ref: 126). 
 
4.7.3 Reasons for Choices Made by Respondents  
The reasons given for choices made were categorized into four main themes: 
humane (RE-HU), moral (RE-MO), pragmatic (RE-PRG), and availability of 
alternatives (RE-ALT) (see Appendix H for a summary of the reasons given).  
 
4.7.3.1 Electronic monitoring 
Humane reasons 
There were managers who disagreed to use electronic monitoring because they 
felt that it created mistrust at the workplace (RE-HU-TRUST). This is the most 
frequently quoted reason from managers (n = 23, 20.4%) who chose not to use 
electronic monitoring under this category. The theme on trust was evident from the 
following remarks: “It (use of electronic monitoring) breeds distrust between staff and 
management” (Ref: 56), and “Employee must believe that they are trusted to do their 
job. These devices will make them think otherwise” (Ref: 220).  
 
Moral reasons 
In all, 44.2% of the managers disagreed with the use of electronic monitoring 
based on moral reasons. Approximately 32% (n = 36) of the managers refused to use 
electronic monitoring because they felt that it was an infringement of individual’s 
privacy (RE-MO-PRIVACY). A manager said, “This method invades privacy of an 
individual and this is wrong (Ref: 52). Another person said, “Privacy should be 
valued. There are other ways to correct the situations” (Ref: 115).  
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Pragmatic reasons 
The majority of the managers who agreed to the use of electronic monitoring 
did so because of several pragmatic reasons. The most quoted reason was the 
organization’s interest (RE-PRG-ORG). About 35% (n = 24) of the managers believed 
that it was in the organization’s interest to use electronic monitoring. The specific 
reasons included improving the company’s image, “Since it is affecting company’s 
image, measure will have to be taken to rectify the problem before situation worsens” 
(Ref: 6) and maintaining customer service quality, “Customer service is a key aspect 
of the company’s survival. Both video and phone recording can help to facilitate the 
improvement of customer service” (Ref: 70).  
A major theme observed from those who were against using electronic 
monitoring was the ineffectiveness of the practice (RE-PRG-INEFFECTIVE). There 
were 19 (16.8%) managers who judged the use of electronic monitoring as an 
ineffective practice that would not solve the root cause of the problem, or that its use 
changed the workers’ behavior but not their attitude. The managers said the following: 
“This (electronic monitoring) does not solve the root cause of the problems” (Ref: 17), 
and “Time consuming and tedious to monitor, not effective” (Ref: 103).  
 
Availability of alternatives 
Of the managers who disagreed to use electronic monitoring, 13.3% (n = 15) 
proposed training or educating the staff to improve customer service (RE-ALT-
TRAIN). One manager said, “There are better ways to change the attitude of workers 
towards customers and members of the public. An effective training program will be a 
more viable solution” (Ref: 88).  More than 30% of the managers (n = 34) proposed 
using other methods (RE-ALT-OTHERS) such as making “regular spot checks” on 
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employees (Ref: 13), putting “a better manager in charge” (Ref: 77) and “making 




There were managers (n = 10, 8.2%) who disagreed with retrenching the 
employees on compassionate grounds (RE-HU-COMPASSION). They said, “Even in 
difficult time, the organization still needs to show compassion to staff” (Ref: 56), and 
“These employees have served the company faithfully and it would be sheer 
inhumanity to terminate their services and deprive them of the rewards...” (Ref: 60).  
 
Moral reasons 
The majority of the managers (n = 44, 36.1%) judged the retrenchment of the 
five employees as undeserved, unfair or exploitative. These were categorized under 
the theme of justice (RE-MO-JUSTICE). The following quote was typical: “It is not 
fair to retrench them and take advantage of the situation” (Ref: 58), and “It is unfair 
for them to sacrifice their retirement fund” (Ref: 88). In crediting the employees for 
past contributions and loyalty to the organization, one manager said, “These 
employees have been loyal to the company and have contributed to the company. Due 
recognition should be given” (Ref: 78). 
 
Pragmatic Reasons 
Economic (47.7%, n = 21) factors topped the list of pragmatic reasons given 
by managers who agreed to retrench. Managers who used economic justifications 
commented, “This is a practical cost-saving measure” (Ref: 13), and “Bottom line is 
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more important than anything else. Sacrificing a few soldiers for the greater good is 
sometimes inevitable” (Ref: 222). 
There were also managers who disagreed to retrench employees based on a 
variety of pragmatic reasons. The most quoted reason was employees’ morale (RE-
PRG-MORALE). There were 22 (18.0%) managers who felt that the decision would 
lower the morale of the remaining employees. “Certainly, retrenching these five 
employees will help to save a hefty sum of money for the company. But it will cause 
morale problem (Ref: 8), and “This is the wrong decision. It is bad PR for the 
company and will affect morale of employees staying behind” (Ref: 80).  
 
Availability of Alternatives 
Generally, the managers who disagreed to retrench the five employees also 
gave some suggestions to deal with the financial difficulties of the organization. 
Eleven managers (9.0%) suggested using alternatives (RE-ALT-OTHERS) and one 
proposed the following, “The retrenchment fund can be paid to them (employees) in 
stages subject to a maximum period so that the cost can be spread out” (Ref: 82). 
There were managers who proposed salary cuts (RE-ALT-PAYCUT), “Look at 
alternatives like negotiating salary cuts for the five employees...” (Ref: 143) or giving 
the employees an early retirement (RE-ALT-EARLY RETIRE), “…I will use early 
retirement rather than retrenchment & work out a package that will satisfy both 
employees and the company” (Ref: 102). 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
The results, their implications, suggestions for future research and limitations 
of this study will be discussed in Chapter Five.  
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5.1 Discussion of Main Findings  
The results of this study show that a partial model of the theory of planned 
behavior can be applied to ethical dilemmas, in particular to issues concerning the use 
of electronic monitoring and retrenchment of employees in an Asian context.  
Contrary to our expectations, accountability pressures and obedience to authority have 
little or no impact as moderators on the relations within our proposed model.  
In view of the increasing interest in corporate ethics, this study is timely, an 
indicator of managers’ responses to ethical dilemmas and an exploration of the factors 
that influenced their intentions. Respondents perceived the ethical issues in both work 
dilemmas. Corresponding to this recognition, respondents tended to disagree with 
intentions to use electronic monitoring systems or to retrench the employees as 
portrayed in the vignettes.  
 
5.1.1 Do Attitudes, Subjective norms, Perceived Control and Self-efficacy 
Influence Intentions to Use Electronic Monitoring or Retrench 
Employees? 
The regression analyses showed that attitudes and subjective norms could 
explain between 48 to 69 percent of the variance in intentions for the two scenarios. 
Respondents’ attitudes toward using electronic monitoring and retrenching the 
employees in the scenarios were largely negative. The hierarchical regression results 
indicated that attitudes emerged as a strong predictor of intentions to use electronic 
monitoring and retrench the five employees, Traditionally, attitude could be viewed 
from the cognitive, affective or behavioral aspects (Katz, 1960: 460; Ostrom, 1969).  
This study measured attitude as a general construct. Different facets of attitudes may 
influence intentions and behaviors differently. Hence, future studies may want to 
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examine whether specific aspects of attitudes (cognitive, affective or behavioral) exert 
different degree of influence on intentions. 
While past studies have shown mixed support for the role of subjective norms 
in the theory of planned behavior, this study contributes additional empirical evidence 
for the important role of subjective norms in influencing intentions. As mentioned in 
the literature review, both vignettes portrayed highly visible decisions. Hence, the 
perceived social pressures of important others were likely to influence the decision 
making process. Another reason could be that the respondents were asked to rate 
perceived social pressures with reference to the most salient referent group – 
organizational members. Past studies generally instructed respondents to rate the 
subjective norms items with reference to important others, without specifying who the 
important others were. There were also studies that gave a wide range of referent 
groups, where respondents had to rate the subjective norm items with reference to all 
the referent groups. Asking respondents to consider irrelevant referent groups may 
distort the true results when the ratings were pooled together as one measure. A clear 
referent group allowed the respondents to work on common platforms and be more 
focused in their ratings. Hence, future studies may want to examine whether 
consideration of different referent groups actually influences one’s perceived 
subjective norms differently. 
Contrary to Ajzen’s (1991) claim that perceived behavioral control improved 
the prediction of behavioral intentions, this variable did not emerge as a significant 
predictor in this study. We measured this construct using two variables: perceived 
control and self-efficacy. Both variables emerged as distinct dimensions in the factor 
analyses. Perceived control was positively correlated with intentions to use electronic 
monitoring. However, it did not contribute unique variance in explaining intentions to 
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use electronic monitoring or retrench employees. Self-efficacy also failed to show up 
as an important factor in influencing intentions. This finding reinforced Flannery and 
May’s (2001) earlier findings on ethical decision making. Since retrenchment and use 
of electronic monitoring were organization-wide or department-wide decisions, 
respondents might have felt that there was a need to make group decisions, rather than 
individual decisions. Hence, group efficacy could be a more appropriate measure in 
future studies (Hill et al., 1996).  
On an exploratory basis, we examined the role of perceived worth of effort as a 
determinant of behavioral intentions. Unfortunately, the two items that measured the 
variable did not achieve acceptable reliability ratings or load well on the expected 
factor structure as they were not established items. Nonetheless, perceived worth of 
effort was seen as a relatively important cause of behavior when respondents were 
asked to make attributions of their behavioral choices. Future studies may want to 
improve the variable’s measurement, validity of items and test its usefulness in 
influencing one’s intentions. 
 
5.1.2 Do Presence of Authority’s Directive or Accountability Pressures 
Moderate the Relations Within the Model? 
The presence of authority’s directive exhibited main effects but no interaction 
effects on respondent’s intentions to retrench the employees. Respondents appeared 
less agreeable to retrench the five employees in the absence of legitimate authority’s 
directions to do so. This finding suggests that managers could be more willing to 
execute ethically questionable behavior when directed to do so by higher authorities. 
On the other hand, respondents seemed to be more influenced by their own attitudes 
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and perceptions of social pressures, rather than by social influences for the electronic 
monitoring vignette.  
One reason why presence of authority’s directive did not have main effects on 
the use of electronic monitoring could be due to differences in the perceived 
seriousness of the decisions in the scenarios.  Many Singapore organizations have 
undergone retrenchment exercises for the past few years. Almost every quarter, the 
press releases news about the dampened economic situation and the downturns in the 
job market, caused partly by retrenchments, with one of the latest exercises involving 
the Singapore Airlines’ employees (The Straits Times, 27 July 2003). Given the 
publicity and sensitivity of the issue, respondents could have been primed to view the 
retrenchment decision as a more serious issue relative to the electronic monitoring 
scenario. In addition, they could also be more sensitized to the negative consequences 
of their decisions on the retrenched employees. In a retrenchment situation, terminated 
employees, especially those without union support, have little chances of getting 
recourse. On the other hand, employees who disagree with the electronic monitoring 
policy could choose to leave the organization or communicate their unhappiness to the 
management. In retrospection, monitored employees could be perceived as “better-
off” than retrenched employees. Another related reason why the variable only showed 
main effects in one scenario could be due to the perceived responsibility associated 
with the decisions in the scenarios. If managers perceived the retrenchment decision as 
a more serious issue than electronic monitoring, they might attribute heavier 
responsibilities associated with the retrenchment decision. To avoid bearing the entire 
consequences or responsibilities of the retrenchment decisions, they would be more 
responsive to superiors’ instructions concerning retrenchment. In the event they faced 
opposition or retaliation from retrenched employees, they could relinquish the 
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responsibility and justify that they had simply follow their superiors’ instructions 
(Milgram, 1974). Future research could consider the influence of decision types or the 
perceived magnitude of consequences on the choices made and their roles in our 
proposed model. 
Accountability to affected employees did not have main or interaction effects 
in the moderated regression model for both scenarios. Although we have a primed 
audience in the scenarios (e.g. retrenched employees),  it is likely that the managers 
also considered latent pressures from other stakeholders (e.g. shareholders) to retrench 
selected staff due to redundancy or corporate survival. In the electronic monitoring 
situation, managers could be more anxious about customers’ satisfaction rather than 
employees’ concerns with invasion of privacy. Another possibility why accountability 
pressures did not moderate the relations with our proposed model could be due to the 
respondents’ seniority or positions in their organizations. About 90% of the 
respondents were either mid-level or senior level managers who held company titles 
such as “managers”, “senior managers”, “general managers”, “directors” or “vice-
presidents”. Those were people in positions of authority and likely to be strategic or 
tactical decision makers. So while explicit accountability pressures could be one of the 
managers’ considerations, these managers probably took on a more macro perspective 
prior to making the decisions. Trained to think and consider from multiple 
stakeholders’ perspective, they could be less likely to succumb to external pressures 
from employees. This view is somewhat supported from the qualitative results, where 
some managers considered the decisions from a combination of moral and 
organizational perspectives.  
Another possibility for the insignificant results of the moderators was that the 
conditions (high versus low accountability, presence versus absence of authority’s 
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directive) were not manipulated successfully. The mean scores for the manipulation 
check questions were near the mid-range ( em = 3.21 for accountability and 2.90 for 
authority condition, r = 3.59 for accountability and 3.01 for authority condition, 
where 1 = Strongly agree and 7 = Strongly disagree), which meant that the conditions 
might not have achieved the intended effects. A way to make the conditions more 
salient in future research would be to request the respondents to prepare a short letter 
or memo to the legitimate authority or to the affected employees to explain their 
decisions. In doing so, they may experience a greater awareness of the need to be 
accountable to affected employees or to the legitimate authority. The presence of 
methodological artifacts could be another reason why the moderating effects cannot be 
detected by moderated multiple regressions. It is likely that moderating effects go 
undetected because of main and interactive effects of research related factors, such as 
predictor variable range restriction, total sample size and unequal sample sizes across 
moderator-based subgroups (see article by Agunis and Stone-Romero, 1997 for a 
detailed discussion and analysis).  
In brief, we have seen that changes in attitude and subjective norms led to 
changes in behavioral intentions. Both attitude and subjective norms contributed 
unique variance to explaining behavioral intentions. The more negative the attitudes 
were toward use of electronic monitoring or retrenching the five employees, the 
weaker the intentions to execute the decisions. The lower the perceived social 
pressures to use electronic monitoring or retrench employees, the weaker the 
intentions to do so. The results also suggest that the respondents were more inclined to 
retrench employees when instructed to do so by a legitimate authority. 
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5.2 Practical Contributions and Implications  
The majority of past studies have tested the theory of planned behavior model 
on social or personal behavior. Few studies have used the model in organizational 
research. This study has extended the applicability and increased the realism of the 
model to organizational settings in an Asian context. It has also extended the 
application of the model to modern business decisions. Specifically, it has 
demonstrated its usefulness in explaining and predicting organizational issues on 
retrenchment and use of electronic monitoring.  
This study allows us to identify the variables (e.g. attitudes) that influence 
one’s intention to use electronic monitoring or to retrench workers. With this 
knowledge, organizations could structure their code of ethics, social structures, 
rewards, sanctions and ethics training to socialize employees to embrace beliefs that 
will motivate them to perform the desired behavior  (Ford & Richardson, 1994; 
Trevino & Victor, 1992).   
Empirical studies on the use of electronic monitoring and retrenchment in 
Singapore are scant. This study has revealed insights on the extent of support for the 
use of electronic monitoring and retrenchment of retiring employees among Singapore 
managers. While the qualitative results showed that a greater group of respondents 
tended to disagree to use electronic monitoring or to retrench the employees, there 
were also some respondents who would use electronic monitoring or retrench the 
employees under certain conditions. From various stakeholders’ perspectives, the 
decisions to use electronic monitoring and to retrench the employees nearing 
retirement could have serious implications for the organizations. 
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5.2.1 Use of Electronic Monitoring and its Implications 
A question to ask when considering the use of electronic surveillance is 
whether employees even have a right to privacy at the workplace (Hartman, 2001). 
Some respondents argued that employees had no right to make personal phone calls or 
engage in personal activities at the workplace. Yet, some managers also felt that using 
electronic monitoring was an invasion of employees’ privacy or would cause more 
negative consequences. The general perception was that respect for a person is closely 
linked to respecting his or her privacy.  
The scenario on electronic monitoring was presented such that the proposed 
video taping of the staff’s activities would be carried out stealthily with the use of 
hidden cameras. Interestingly, one person commented that electronic monitoring 
should be employed carefully so that employees would not know about its use. 
Nonetheless, from the reasons given by respondents, it was obvious that covert 
monitoring was frowned upon. Even if employee’s privacy at the workplace is an 
entitlement and not a right, secret monitoring reflects poorly on an organization’s 
corporate image and values.  
Examining the use of electronic monitoring from different stakeholders’ 
perspective has a direct bearing on the decisions made. It appears that most managers 
who agreed to use electronic monitoring did so in the interest of the organization 
while those who disagreed usually looked at the issue from the perspective of the 
employees. There were also exceptions, in that some managers agreed to use 
electronic monitoring, with the intention of protecting employees from being falsely 
accused by customers. Alder (1998) argued that the supporters and critics of electronic 
monitoring framed their arguments based on self-centered needs and interests. 
However, such an approach does not adequately consider the impact of electronic 
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monitoring on employees’ privacy and stress levels. Hence, a more holistic and sound 
approach could be to look at the motivation, the implementation and the consequences 
of the decision from different stakeholders’ perspectives.  
Most managers indicated that their organizations did not have policies that 
restrict the use of electronic monitoring. The non-existence of such a policy could 
have communicated the message that the use of electronic monitoring was in the very 
least acceptable, if managers chose to use surveillance systems at their discretion. 
Research has shown that existence of a code of conduct or corporate policy statement 
on ethical behavior is consistently and significantly related to ethical behavior (Ford & 
Richardson, 1994). With no clear guidelines, managers are likely to depend on their 
own judgment and values or perceived social pressures to make decisions concerning 
the use of electronic monitoring.  
 
5.2.2 Retrenchment of Employees and its Implications 
As pointed out by some respondents, retrenching the five employees and 
depriving them of their retirement fund would lower the morale of other employees. 
Our scenario was deliberately manipulated to present a dilemma. Yet, even in 
relatively normal situations, it has been well documented that surviving employees 
reported lower morale or less favorable job attitudes after their organizations had 
experienced downsizing or restructuring (Armstrong-Stassen, 2002; Allen, Freeman, 
Russell, Reizenstein & Rentz, 2001; Luthans & Sommer, 1999). Decision makers are 
sometimes required to exhibit the virtue of toughness in situations where 
retrenchment, even if unjust, is essential to the survival of the entire organization 
(Solomon, 1999). The decision maker may experience pain and guilt in executing the 
decision, or even feel that the act, if isolated from the circumstances, is downright 
CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION 
 81
wrong. However, one is exhibiting the virtue of toughness by “doing what was 
necessary” and “doing it as humanely as possible” (Solomon, 1999: 92). One manager 
said, “Impact of economic slowdown and changes to market trend require hard 
decisions to be made….” (Ref: 207). When corporations are in perilous situations, and 
all viable options exhausted, then retrenchment could be inevitable. 
 Communication with the employees is extremely important if retrenchment is 
being considered (Jossi, 2001). Explanations of how and why layoff decisions are 
made have been shown to increase individuals’ perceptions of fairness of the layoff 
process, their willingness to endorse the organizations’ decisions, and lessen the 
possibility of retrenched workers suing their employers (Wanberg et al., 1999). 
Managers who agreed to retrench the five employees near retirement and 
deprive them of their retirement fund were cost-conscious or profit-oriented. Human 
resource practitioners have been encouraging corporations to consider other options 
before laying off staff (Jossi, 2001). The benefits of considering other options are 
many. For instance, if the downturns are cases of business cycles, the corporations 
may have difficulty exploiting growth opportunities when there are upturns because 
they lack the experienced human resources. Furthermore, corporations that make the 
effort to consider other options rather than use retrenchment as quick fixes, are likely 
to raise the morale of workers. While retrenchment is one of the ways to save costs, 
corporations may find themselves in greater debts resulting from the payment of 
retrenchment benefits. According to a news report, the current system of retrenchment 
benefits payment depleted organizations’ financial resources tremendously and could 
also put other jobs in the organizations at risk (The Straits Times, 5 Aprilb 2002). 
Retrenched employees were usually paid according to their length of service in the 
organizations. However, companies usually do not set aside funds for such benefits 
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and have to look for funds when the retrenchments occur. Rather than laying off staff, 
some of the more common “creative cost restructuring measures” used by 
corporations include enforced vacations, encouragement of unpaid leave, delays in 
fixed cost initiatives, voluntary retirement for top management, and voluntary salary 
reductions (The Straits Times, 7 June 2002; 26 Mar 2002).  
The process by which retrenchment is executed can also differentiate one 
organization’s level of professionalism from another. A local bank, Overseas Chinese 
Bank Corporation (OCBC), was applauded for its efforts to provide the necessary 
social support for retrenched employees (The Straits Times, 28 Mar 2002). Fellow 
workers served as buddies to support those retrenched. Transition workshops and 
counseling service were set up for retrenched staff. Extensions of concessionary 
housing and unsecured loan rates to retrenched staff for at least 12 months were made 
(The Straits Times, 17 Mar 2002).  
 
5.3 Limitations 
One of the assumptions in applying the theory of planned behavior was that 
the predictive accuracy of behavioral intentions generally varied inversely with the 
time period between measurement of intention and observation of behavior (Ajzen & 
Madden, 1986). The power of intentions as a predictor of future behavior was likely to 
weaken as time progresses. In a research conducted by De Vries et al. (1995), they 
found intentions measured at the initial period of their study, Time 1, to be the best 
predictor of both actual smoking behavior at Time 1 itself and future smoking 
behavior measured at different subsequent period intervals, 6 (Time 2), 12 (Time 3), 
and 18 (Time 4) months after the initial survey. As such, one caution in applying the 
results is that the decision makers’ actual behavior may differ from our predictions in 
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the face of changing circumstances over time. For instance, many companies were 
retrenching people at the time when the surveys were distributed. So the economic 
situation could have influenced the decision makers’ intentions. One way to verify the 
influence of the macro environment on decision maker’s response is to test the 
instrument under favorable economic situations or to conduct a longitudinal study. 
There was a manager who indicated that his intentions to use electronic 
monitoring could not be attributed to ability, control or worth of efforts. Rather, it was 
dependent on his values. Another manager commented that from a cost perspective, 
his attitudes toward retrenching the employees were positive. From an ethical 
perspective, his attitudes would be negative. These suggest that future studies may 
want to include personal values to complement the theory of planned behavior. 
In this study, decision makers had limited choices concerning their intentions 
to perform the behavior. They could only indicate the extent of their agreement or 
disagreement to use electronic monitoring and retrench the employees. In actual 
situations, managers are likely to have more options. We dealt with this limitation by 
giving respondents a chance to explain why they choose a particular answer. In doing 
so, they were given the opportunities to suggest alternatives and voice their views.  
To keep the survey of reasonable length, social desirability measures were not 
included in the survey. However, efforts were made to minimize social desirable 
answers in that respondents were assured anonymity of their identities.   
 
5.4 Conclusion 
In this study, the theory of planned behavior has presented a parsimonious 
model for ethical decision making in organizations. Attitudes and subjective norms 
played important roles. Within the attitudinal component, there could be individual 
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attitudinal beliefs that run contrary to corporate beliefs. Some managers who were 
personally against retrenchments chose to do so because of organizational interests. 
Similarly, there could also be individual beliefs that contradict the perceived social 
pressures experienced by individuals. Even though one’s attitudinal beliefs motivate 
one’s intention, one may feel compelled to take a different course because of peer 
pressures or superiors’ directions.   When an individual encounters such tensions, 
awareness of how attitudes and perceived social pressures influence one’s intentions 
can provide a clearer picture of the forces that led to certain decisions. Self-awareness 
may allow the person to make a more sound decision. As the theory of planned 
behavior postulates, our underlying beliefs influence our attitudes, subjective norms 
and perceived behavior control over the behavioral outcomes. Ultimately, it is 
important for corporations and the individuals to be aware of their values and decide 
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Scenario: Electronic Monitoring  
 
Condition: High Accountability to Employees (HA) 
 
Over the last few months you have received a steadily increasing number of complaints 
against front-line employees in your organization. Customers alleged that the telephone 
operators were sarcastic and hostile. There were also complaints that officers at service 
counters were unprofessional in their dealings with members of the public. 
 
A way to identify the poor performing employees is to use electronic monitoring systems to tap 
telephone operators’ phone conversations and use hidden cameras to videotape customer 
service officers’ interactions with members of the public. You must find the culprits as soon as 
possible. Continuing such poor service will cause customers to lose confidence in your 
organization and severely damage the organization’s image. 
 
The cost of the electronic monitoring systems is not an issue because you have a budget to 
improve customer service. The expenses incurred from the installation of monitoring systems 
can be met from the budget.  
 
However, there are other concerns. It is impossible to differentiate work-related calls from 
personal calls, so the phone tapping systems will record all employees’ conversations with 
internal and external parties, including their personal phone calls with friends, spouses and 
others.  
 
Besides videotaping the customer service officers, it is also inevitable that the hidden video 
cameras will monitor other employees’ behavior. The video cameras will be activated on all 
working days. It will capture all aspects of employees’ activities, including their conversations 
with co-workers, their movements, their whereabouts and conduct.  
 
It is COMPANY POLICY that if you decide to use electronic monitoring (i.e. phone 
tapping and video taping), you HAVE to explain and justify your decision to all the 
employees being monitored.  
 






















Condition: Low Accountability to Employees (LA) 
Over the last few months you have received a steadily increasing number of complaints 
against front-line employees in your organization. Customers alleged that the telephone 
operators were sarcastic and hostile. There were also complaints that officers at service 
counters were unprofessional in their dealings with members of the public. 
 
A way to identify the poor performing employees is to use electronic monitoring systems to tap 
telephone operators’ phone conversations and use hidden cameras to videotape customer 
service officers’ interactions with members of the public. You must find the culprits as soon as 
possible. Continuing such poor service will cause customers to lose confidence in your 
organization and severely damage the organization’s image. 
 
The cost of the electronic monitoring systems is not an issue because you have a budget to 
improve customer service. The expenses incurred from the installation of monitoring systems 
can be met from the budget. The hidden cameras will be installed along with some office 
renovations so that employees will not know about their installation.  
 
However, there are other concerns. It is impossible to differentiate work-related calls from 
personal calls, so the phone tapping systems will record all employees’ conversations with 
internal and external parties, including their personal phone calls with friends, spouses and 
others.  
 
Besides videotaping the customer service officers, it is also inevitable that the hidden video 
cameras will monitor other employees’ behavior. The video cameras will be activated on all 
working days. It will capture all aspects of employees’ activities, including their conversations 
with co-workers, their movements, their whereabouts and conduct.  
 
If you decide to use electronic monitoring (i.e. phone tapping and video taping), you DO 
NOT HAVE to explain and justify your decision to the employees being monitored. 
Employees will not know that they are being monitored and the implementation of 
electronic monitoring will be kept confidential. 
 























Condition: Presence of Legitimate Authority’s Directive (PA) 
 
You just received an urgent email from the President. He wrote the following:  
 
“Over the last few months, I have received a steadily increasing number of complaints against 
our front-line employees. Customers alleged that our telephone operators were sarcastic and 
hostile. There were also complaints that officers at service counters were unprofessional in 
their dealings with members of the public.  
 
Please investigate the matter thoroughly. A way to identify the poor performing employees is 
to use electronic monitoring systems to tap telephone operators’ phone conversations and 
use hidden cameras to videotape customer service officers’ interactions with members of the 
public.  
 
We must find the culprits as soon as possible. Continuing such poor service will cause 
customers to lose confidence in the organization and severely damage the organization’s 
image.”  
 
The cost of the electronic monitoring systems is not an issue because you have a budget to 
improve customer service. The expenses incurred from the installation of monitoring systems 
can be met from the budget. The hidden cameras will be installed along with some office 
renovations so that employees will not know about their installation.  
 
However, there are other concerns. It is impossible to differentiate work-related calls from 
personal calls, so the phone tapping systems will record all employees’ conversations with 
internal and external parties, including their personal phone calls with friends, spouses and 
others.  
 
Besides videotaping the customer service officers, it is also inevitable that the hidden video 
cameras will monitor other employees’ behavior. The video cameras will be activated on all 
working days. It will capture all aspects of employees’ activities, including their conversations 
with co-workers, their movements, their whereabouts and conduct.  
 























Condition: Absence of Legitimate Authority’s Directive (AA) 
 
Over the last few months you have received a steadily increasing number of complaints 
against front-line employees in your organization. Customers alleged that the telephone 
operators were sarcastic and hostile. There were also complaints that officers at service 
counters were unprofessional in their dealings with members of the public. 
 
A way to identify the poor performing employees is to use electronic monitoring systems to tap 
telephone operators’ phone conversations and use hidden cameras to videotape customer 
service officers’ interactions with members of the public. You must find the culprits as soon as 
possible. Continuing such poor service will cause customers to lose confidence in your 
organization and severely damage the organization’s image. 
 
The cost of the electronic monitoring systems is not an issue because you have a budget to 
improve customer service. The expenses incurred from the installation of monitoring systems 
can be met from the budget. The hidden cameras will be installed along with some office 
renovations so that employees will not know about their installation.  
 
However, there are other concerns. It is impossible to differentiate work-related calls from 
personal calls, so the phone tapping systems will record all employees’ conversations with 
internal and external parties, including their personal phone calls with friends, spouses and 
others.  
 
Besides videotaping the customer service officers, it is also inevitable that the hidden video 
cameras will monitor other employees’ behavior. The video cameras will be activated on all 
working days. It will capture all aspects of employees’ activities, including their conversations 
with co-workers, their movements, their whereabouts and conduct.  
 
































Scenario: Retrenchment of Employees  
 
Condition: High Accountability to Employees (HA) 
 
Because of falling business demand and the recent economic slowdown, it is becoming very 
costly for the organization where you work to maintain all its current business units. The 
changing market trends have also inevitably made some business units redundant. There is a 
pressing need for your organization to concentrate on its core businesses to ensure survival 
and growth. 
 
A restructuring team was formed to streamline work processes and phase out business units 
in your organization. The restructuring team has just sent all the managers a list of proposed 
measures.  If you have no objections to their proposed measures, you can proceed to 
implement them. 
 
The proposal includes a list of executives from your business unit selected for retrenchment. 
You noticed that five of the staff on the list have been working with the organization for more 
than twenty years and are a few months away from retirement. According to company’s policy, 
these five staff will receive a hefty sum of money upon retirement. However, if they are 
terminated before retirement age, they will lose the entire retirement fund. Although these 
retrenched staff will get a severance package, the amount is only a fraction of their retirement 
fund.  
 
In terms of performance and skills, these five employees are comparable to some of their 
more junior counterparts, who have been transferred rather than retrenched. The reason is 
clear: the high costs incurred from the salaries and retirement fund of these senior staff are a 
burden to the organization.  
 
It is COMPANY POLICY that if you decide to retrench the five employees, you HAVE to 
explain and justify your decision to all of them. You must be prepared to have 
individual dialogue sessions with each of the five employees as they are unlikely to 
accept retrenchment passively.     
 
You have to make the decision: Do you intend to retrench the five employees who are near 





















Condition: Low Accountability to Employees (LA) 
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Because of falling business demand and the recent economic slowdown, it is becoming very 
costly for the organization where you work to maintain all its current business units. The 
changing market trends have also inevitably made some business units redundant. There is a 
pressing need for your organization to concentrate on its core businesses to ensure survival 
and growth. 
 
A restructuring team was formed to streamline work processes and phase out business units 
in your organization. The restructuring team has just sent all the managers a list of proposed 
measures.  If you have no objections to their proposed measures, you can proceed to 
implement them. 
 
The proposal includes a list of executives from your business unit selected for retrenchment. 
You noticed that five of the staff on the list have been working with the organization for more 
than twenty years and are a few months away from retirement. According to company’s policy, 
these five staff will receive a hefty sum of money upon retirement. However, if they are 
terminated before retirement age, they will lose the entire retirement fund. Although these 
retrenched staff will get a severance package, the amount is only a fraction of their retirement 
fund.  
 
In terms of performance and skills, these five employees are comparable to some of their 
more junior counterparts, who have been transferred rather than retrenched. The reason is 
clear: the high costs incurred from the salaries and retirement fund of these senior staff are a 
burden to the organization.  
 
If you decide to retrench the five employees, you DO NOT HAVE to explain and justify 
your decision to any of them as they will be informed directly by the restructuring team. 
 
You have to make the decision: Do you intend to retrench the five employees who are near 

























Condition: Presence of Legitimate Authority’s Directive (PA) 
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This morning, you received the following memorandum from your company’s CEO: 
 
“Given falling business demand and the recent economic slowdown, it is becoming very costly 
for the organization to maintain all its current business units. The changing market trends 
have also inevitably made some of our business units redundant. There is a pressing need to 
concentrate on our core businesses to ensure the organization’s survival and growth.  
 
As you know, a restructuring team was formed to streamline work processes and phase out 
business units. I have endorsed their proposals and given them the mandate to proceed with 
the measures. These measures include closure of some business units and retrenchment of 
employees. Give your assistance to the team in administering the necessary changes. It is a 
painful decision but I ask for your cooperation and support during this transition.” 
 
Attached to the memorandum is a list of proposed measures, which includes a list of 
executives from your business unit selected for retrenchment. You noticed that five of the staff 
on the list have been working with the organization for more than twenty years and are a few 
months away from retirement. According to company’s policy, these five staff will receive a 
hefty sum of money upon retirement. However, if they are terminated before retirement age, 
they will lose the entire retirement fund. Although these retrenched staff will get a severance 
package, the amount is only a fraction of their retirement fund.  
 
In terms of performance and skills, these five employees are comparable to some of their 
more junior counterparts, who have been transferred rather than retrenched. The reason is 
clear: the high costs incurred from the salaries and retirement fund of these senior staff are a 
burden to the organization.  
 
You have to make the decision: Do you intend to retrench the five employees who are near 






























Condition: Absence of Legitimate Authority’s Directive (AA) 
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Because of falling business demand and the recent economic slowdown, it is becoming very 
costly for the organization where you work to maintain all its current business units. The 
changing market trends have also inevitably made some business units redundant. There is a 
pressing need for your organization to concentrate on its core businesses to ensure survival 
and growth. 
 
A restructuring team was formed to streamline work processes and phase out business units 
in your organization. The restructuring team has just sent all the managers a list of proposed 
measures.  If you have no objections to their proposed measures, you can proceed to 
implement them. 
 
The proposal includes a list of executives from your business unit selected for retrenchment. 
You noticed that five of the staff on the list have been working with the organization for more 
than twenty years and are a few months away from retirement. According to company’s policy, 
these five staff will receive a hefty sum of money upon retirement. However, if they are 
terminated before retirement age, they will lose the entire retirement fund. Although these 
retrenched staff will get a severance package, the amount is only a fraction of their retirement 
fund.  
 
In terms of performance and skills, these five employees are comparable to some of their 
more junior counterparts, who have been transferred rather than retrenched. The reason is 
clear: the high costs incurred from the salaries and retirement fund of these senior staff are a 
burden to the organization.  
 
You have to make the decision: Do you intend to retrench the five employees who are near 



















Thank you for taking the time to respond to this questionnaire. 
 
Your participation will help researchers to have a better understanding of how people make 
decisions on work issues. Hence, we will appreciate very much if you can help to complete 
this questionnaire and send it back to us in the business reply envelope within two weeks of 
receiving the questionnaire or by 22 Jun 2002 (whichever is feasible). Please do not hesitate 
to contact us by email if you have any queries concerning this study. 
 
The information you provide to this questionnaire is solely for research purposes and will be 
held in the strictest confidence. Research reports will include only group level data that 
cannot be traced to individuals or corporations.  
 
We look forward to receiving the completed questionnaire from you.  
 










Dr. Audrey Chia     Ms Chia Nah Nah 
Associate Professor, NUS Business School  MSc student, NUS Business School 







Please put yourself in the position of the decision maker in the scenario below and answer 
the questions that follow. There are no right or wrong answers to the questions. We are interested 
in your honest opinions.    
 
Scenario One: Electronic Monitoring of Employees  
 
Over the last few months you have received a steadily increasing number of complaints against 
front-line employees in your organization. Customers alleged that the telephone operators were 
sarcastic and hostile. There were also complaints that officers at service counters were 
unprofessional in their dealings with members of the public. 
 
A way to identify the poor performing employees is to use electronic monitoring systems to tap 
telephone operators’ phone conversations and use hidden cameras to videotape customer 
service officers’ interactions with members of the public. You must find the culprits as soon as 
possible. Continuing such poor service will cause customers to lose confidence in your 
organization and severely damage the organization’s image. 
 
The cost of the electronic monitoring systems is not an issue because you have a budget to 
improve customer service. The expenses incurred from the installation of monitoring systems can 
be met from the budget. The hidden cameras will be installed along with some office renovations 
so that employees will not know about their installation.  
 
However, there are other concerns. It is impossible to differentiate work-related calls from 
personal calls, so the phone tapping systems will record all employees’ conversations with 
internal and external parties, including their personal phone calls with friends, spouses and 
others.  
 
Besides videotaping the customer service officers, it is also inevitable that the hidden video 
cameras will monitor other employees’ behavior. The video cameras will be activated on all 
working days. It will capture all aspects of employees’ activities, including their conversations with 
co-workers, their movements, their whereabouts and conduct.  
 
You have to make the decision: Do you intend to use electronic monitoring on the employees? 
 
 
SECTION A:  
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following items and circle the 





































          
 a) I intend to use electronic monitoring. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7   
1) Putting yourself in the position of the  
    decision maker, what do you intend to do?
 













Putting yourself in the position of the decision maker, who is/are the important person(s) in your 
organization likely to influence your decision to use electronic monitoring? Please list them 
below. If there is more than one person who influences your decision, please rank them accordingly, 
with the person who exerts the greatest influence ranked as 1, followed by 2 and so on. 
1) The person(s) in the organization who is/are likely to influence my decision is/are: 
 





                   _____ 
b) _________________________ 
 
                   _____ 
c) _________________________ 
 
Note: Please list the person’s job title or relationship to you. 
 
                   _____ 
The next two items refer to the organizational person(s) you have listed above. Please indicate 
the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following items and circle the corresponding 
numbers on the scales provided. Please note that 1 = Strongly Agree and 7 = Strongly Disagree. 




































2a) The organizational person(s) I listed above would  
think that I should use electronic monitoring. 
 
2b) The organizational person(s) I listed above would 
encourage me to use electronic monitoring.  
 
SECTION C 
Please indicate what you think of electronic monitoring by placing a checkmark “X” on one of the 
blanks of each scale. An example is given below. 
Example: In general, Singapore’s weather is       
  Uncomfortable :___:___:___:___:___:___:___: Comfortable 
 
If you think Singapore’s weather is relatively comfortable, you may place “X” on any of the blanks located nearer 
to “Comfortable”.  
Uncomfortable :___:___:___:___:___:_X_:___: Comfortable 
 
If you consider Singapore’s weather to be extremely uncomfortable, you may want to place “X” on the blank 
located nearest “Uncomfortable”. 
  Uncomfortable :_ X_:___:___:___:___:___:___: Comfortable 
 
On the whole, using electronic monitoring is:  
 
Bad :___:___:___:___:___:___:___: Good 
 
 Harmful :___:___:___:___:___:___:___: Beneficial 
 
                           Undesirable :___:___:___:___:___:___:___: Desirable 
 
 




Part I & II examine your perceptions of the situation portrayed in the scenario. Please circle the 
corresponding numbers on the scales provided.  
 
Part I 
1) For me to use electronic monitoring would be 
   easy                                                                                        difficult 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7   
2) How much control do you have over whether you do or do not use electronic monitoring? 
  Complete                                                                              Very little 
  Control                                                                                   Control 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7   
3) If I wanted to, I could easily choose to use electronic monitoring.  
  Strongly                                                                                  Strongly 
   Agree                                                                                     Disagree 





With reference to your role as the decision maker in the situation described in the scenario please 
indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements and circle the corresponding 
numbers on the scales provided. Please note that 1 = Strongly Agree and 7 = Strongly Disagree 




































1) My past experiences in life increase my confidence  
    that I am qualified to make a decision concerning   















2) It will probably take too much of my effort to use    
















3) I feel confident that my skills, abilities and 
     knowledge qualify me to make a decision     















4) It is worth my time and energy to use electronic   
















        
Part III 
In your opinion, which of the following cause(s) is/are likely to influence your decision to use electronic 
monitoring. You may tick (9) more than one bracket. 
 
1) your ability (skills, experience & knowledge) to use electronic monitoring 
2) your control over the decision to use electronic monitoring 
3) whether it is worth your efforts to use electronic monitoring 
  
  (    ) 
  (    ) 
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SECTION E  
 
1) Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements and circle the corresponding numbers on the scales provided. Please note 
that 1 = Strongly Agree and 7 = Strongly Disagree. 





































a) There is an ethical issue in the scenario  
    on electronic  monitoring. 
 




b) It is clear that no one has directed you to 
    use  electronic  monitoring. 
 





2) Does your company have a policy that prohibits the use of electronic monitoring? 
    Please tick (9) the appropriate bracket.  
 







3) Does your company use electronic monitoring on employees? 
    Please tick (9) the appropriate bracket. 
 
















If your answer is “yes”, please skip question (3) 
and proceed to the next page.  




Please put yourself in the position of the decision maker in the scenario and answer all the 
questions that follow. There are no right or wrong answers to the questions. We are interested in your 
honest opinions.    
 
Scenario Two: Retrenchment of Employees  
 
Because of falling business demand and the recent economic slowdown, it is becoming very costly for 
the organization where you work to maintain all its current business units. The changing market trends 
have also inevitably made some business units redundant. There is a pressing need for your 
organization to concentrate on its core businesses to ensure survival and growth. 
 
A restructuring team was formed to streamline work processes and phase out business units in your 
organization. The restructuring team has just sent all the managers a list of proposed measures.  If 
you have no objections to their proposed measures, you can proceed to implement them. 
 
The proposal includes a list of executives from your business unit selected for retrenchment. You 
noticed that five of the staff on the list have been working with the organization for more than twenty 
years and are a few months away from retirement. According to company’s policy, these five staff will 
receive a hefty sum of money upon retirement. However, if they are terminated before retirement age, 
they will lose the entire retirement fund. Although these retrenched staff will get a severance package, 
the amount is only a fraction of their retirement fund.  
 
In terms of performance and skills, these five employees are comparable to some of their more junior 
counterparts, who have been transferred rather than retrenched. The reason is clear: the high costs 
incurred from the salaries and retirement fund of these senior staff are a burden to the organization.  
 





The following items examine how people will respond to the retrenchment of employees in the 
scenario. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the items and circle the 
corresponding numbers on the scales provided. Please note that 1 = Strongly Agree and 7 = 
Strongly Disagree 





































a) I intend to retrench the five employees. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6  7  









1) Putting yourself in the position of the   
        decision maker, what do you intend to do? 




Putting yourself in the position of the decision maker, who is/are the important person(s) in your 
organization likely to influence your decision to retrench the five employees? Please list them 
below. If there is more than one person who influences your decision, please rank them accordingly, 
with the person who exerts the greatest influence ranked as 1, followed by 2 and so on.  
 
1) The person(s) in the organization who is/are likely to influence my decision is/are: 
 





                   _____ 
b) _________________________ 
 
                   _____ 
c) _________________________ 
 
Note: Please list the person’s job title or relationship to you. 
 
                   _____ 
The next two items refer to the organizational person (s) you have listed above, please indicate 
the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following items and circle the corresponding 
numbers on the scales provided. Please note that 1 = Strongly Agree and 7 = Strongly Disagree. 











































2a) The organizational person(s) I listed above would  
      think that I should retrench the five employees. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2b) The organizational person(s) I listed above would   





2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
SECTION H 
Please indicate what you think of retrenching the five employees by placing a checkmark “X” on one 
of the blanks of each scale. An example of how to give the rating is shown in SECTION C (pg 2). 
 
On the whole, retrenching the five employees is:  
 
Bad :___:___:___:___:___:___:___: Good 
 
Harmful :___:___:___:___:___:___:___: Beneficial 
 
                            Undesirable :___:___:___:___:___:___:___: Desirable 
 




Part I & II examine your perceptions of the situation portrayed in the scenario. Please circle the 
corresponding numbers on the scales provided.  
 
Part I 
1) For me to retrench the five employees would be 
     easy                                                                                     difficult 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
 
2) How much control do you have over whether you do or do not retrench the five employees? 
 Complete                                                                              Very little 
 Control                                                                                   Control 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
 
3) If I wanted to, I could easily choose to retrench the five employees.  
 Strongly                                                                                 Strongly 




3 4 5 6 7  
Part II 
With reference to your role as the decision maker in the situation described in the scenario please 
indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements and circle the corresponding 
numbers on the scales provided. Please note that 1 = Strongly Agree and 7 = Strongly Disagree 










































1) My past experiences in life increase my confidence  
    that I am qualified to make a decision concerning the  















2) It will probably take too much of my effort to  
















3) I feel confident that my skills, abilities and  
    knowledge qualify me to make a decision concerning   















4) It is worth my time and energy to retrench the five  

















In your opinion, which of the following causes are likely to influence your decision to retrench the 
employees? You may tick (9) more than one bracket.  
 
1) your ability (skills, experience and knowledge) to retrench the employees 
2) your control over the decision to retrench the employees 
3) whether it is worth your efforts to retrench the employees                                    
   
  (    ) 
  (    ) 










1) Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements and circle the corresponding numbers on the scales provided. Please note 
that 1 = Strongly Agree and 7 = Strongly Disagree. 











































a) There is an ethical issue in the scenario on  
    retrenchment of employees. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
b) It is clear that no one has directed you to  
    retrench the employees. 
 




2) Please tick (9) the appropriate bracket for the questions below. 
 
a) Does your company have a policy that prohibits retrenchment? 
     
             Yes (   )         No (    ) Don’t know (    ) 
  
b) Have you ever experienced a retrenchment exercise in any of the organizations you   
    worked with in the past? 
 
Yes (    )        No (    ) Î  If your answer is “no”, please skip  
next question and proceed to Section K. 
 
c) If your answer to question (b) is “yes”, do you think it was handled well?  
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SECTION K: Please tick (9)  the appropriate bracket for the following section. 
 
Age: (years)     Years of work experience:  
1) 21 – 25 (     )   1) 1 – 5 years  (     ) 
2) 26 – 30 (     )   2) 6 – 10 years (     ) 
3) 31 – 35 (     )   3) 11 -15 years (     ) 
4) 36 – 40  (     )   4) 16 – 20 years (     ) 
5) 41 – 45 (     )   5) 21 – 25 years (     ) 
6) 46 – 50 (     )   6) more than 25 years (     ) 
7) 51 and above (     ) 
 
Gender:  1) Male (     )       Sector: 1) Public (     ) 
   2) Female (     )    2) Private (     ) 
 
Race:  
1) Chinese (     ) 
2) Indian (     ) 
3) Malay (     ) 
4) Eurasian (     ) 
5) Others (     ) ____________  
                                  (please specify) 
Education Level: 
1) Post-graduate degree  (     ) 
2) Degree   (     ) 
3) Diploma/ GCE ‘A’ level (     ) 
4) GCE ‘O’ level   (     ) 
5) Others   (     )                    
    __________ (please specify) 
 
Religion: 
1) Buddhism (     ) 
2) Christianity (     ) 
3) Islam (     ) 
4) Taoism (     ) 
5) Hinduism (     ) 
6) Others (     ) _____________ 
                                  (please specify) 
Annual Income (before CPF deduction) 
1) Less than $20, 000   (     ) 
2) Between $20, 000 to $39, 999  (     )  
3) Between $40, 000 to $59, 999  (     ) 
4) Between $60, 000 to $79, 999  (     ) 
5) Between $80, 000 to $99, 999  (     ) 









Staff Strength (Organization): 
 
Position in Company: 
1) Executive        (     ) 
2) Technical  (     )  
3) Manager (     ) 
4) Director (     ) 
5) Others (     ) ___________ 




THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION! 
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Dear «Salute» «Name» 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this letter. 
 
We are currently engaged in a research project that examines business managers’ decisions 
at the workplace. We would like to invite you to participate in our study and also request your 
assistance in distributing the enclosed questionnaires to colleagues who hold middle or senior 
management positions in your organization.  
 
When identifying these colleagues, please choose those who  
• are managers (from any department) and 
• have subordinates reporting to them and  
• have some decision making power in introducing policies or recommending changes in 
       your organization.  
 
We have sent you three questionnaires. If you fit the description given above and are willing to 
help us to fill up one questionnaire, then please help us to distribute the remaining 
questionnaires to two other colleagues. If you do not fit the description, please assist us in 
distributing the questionnaires to three colleagues who do fit the description. 
 
Your help will certainly contribute towards our understanding of how and why business 
managers arrive at the decisions they make. This knowledge will aid us in introducing 
recommendations to optimize the decision making process.  
 
Each respondent is requested to fill up one questionnaire and mail it back to us in the 
business reply envelopes by 10 May 2002. If you would like a copy of the research findings, 
please indicate on the form attached to this letter and fax it to us at 6XXX XXXX (Attn: A/P 
Audrey Chia). 
 
Be assured that the data collected is solely for the purpose of academic research and will be 
kept in the strictest confidence. Research reports will include only group level data that cannot 
be traced to individuals or corporations. 
 
If you have any queries concerning the completion of the questionnaire, please do not 
hesitate to contact us at our email addresses. You may also call Ms Chia Nah Nah at 
9XXXXXXX (HP) for further clarifications.  
 








Dr. Audrey Chia     Ms Chia Nah Nah 
Associate Professor, NUS Business School  MSc Student, NUS Business School 
xxxxxx@nus.edu.sg     xxxxxx@nus.edu.sg 
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REQUEST FOR A COPY OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
Attention:  Associate Professor Audrey Chia 
   Department of Management & Organisation 
   NUS Business School 
 








I am interested to have a copy of the research findings from your study. 
 
Please send a copy to the following recipient and address: 
 
 








   
  ___________________________________ 
 
 
  ___________________________________ 























 Age Range (In Years) 
21-25 years 
26-30 years 


















 Years of Work Experience 
1-5 years 
6-10 years 
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 Education Level 
Others 



















 Annual Income before CPF deduction ($)
Between $20,000
to $39, 999 
Between $40,000  
to $59, 999 
Between $80,000 
to $99, 999 
Between $60,000 




















































































































Industry Type Frequency Percent 
Manufacturing 46 22.5 
Information Technology &/ Telecommunications 19 9.3 
Finance (Banking, Insurance, Investment) 18 8.8 
Electronics 17 8.3 
Construction 14 6.9 
Services 12 5.9 
Transport/Logistics 11 5.4 
Energy/Utilities 7 3.4 
Media (Print) 7 3.4 
Chemical or Petrochemical 7 3.4 
Healthcare 6 2.9 
Retail 5 2.5 
Engineering 5 2.5 
Others 5 2.5 
Property/Real Estate 3 1.5 
Total 182 89.2 
Missing values 22 10.8 
 204 100.0 
 




ORGANIZATIONAL POLICY ON USE OF ELECTRONIC MONITORING 
 Does company have a policy that prohibits  use of electronic monitoring?
















 Does company use EM?
Not 
applicable
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MANAGERS’ PAST EXPERIENCES WITH RETRENCHMENT 
 
H av e  yo u  ev er exp e rien c ed  re tren ch m en t?
















 Was the retrenchment handled well?
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ATTRIBUTION TO CAUSES OF BEHAVIOR IN THE ELECTRONIC MONITORING VIGNETTE 










































Attribution to worth of efforts



















ATTRIBUTION TO CAUSES OF BEHAVIOR IN THE RETRENCHMENT VIGNETTE 










































Attribution to worth of efforts





























Moderating Influence of Accountability Pressures 
 
Table F1: Moderated Hierachical Regression Analysis Model (Electronic 
Monitoring) 
 
Step R R2 Adjusted 
R2 
S.E. of the 
Estimate 
'R2 'F df Sig. F '
1 .49 .24 .21 1.91 .24 8.12 3, 76    .00 ** 
2 .84 .71 .69 1.20 .47 58.91 2, 74    .00 ** 
3 .85 .72 .70 1.18 .02 2.15 2, 72 .12 
4 .86 .73 .70 1.17 .01 2.58 1, 71 .11 
5 .86 .74 .69 1.20 .00 .19 4, 67 .94 
 
TABLE F2: Moderated Hierachical Regression Analysis Model (Retrenchment) 
 
Step R R2 Adjusted 
R2 
S.E. of the 
Estimate 
'R2 'F df Sig. F '
1 .26 .07 .03 1.77 .07 1.88 3, 78 .14 
2 .71 .50 .47 1.31 .43 32.78 2, 76   .00** 
3 .71 .51 .46 1.32 .01 .40 2, 74 .67 
4 .71 .51 .45 1.33 .00 .16 1, 73 .70 
5 .73 .53 .44 1.34 .02 .70 4, 69 .59 
 
Step 1’s predictors: (Constant), Recognition of Ethical Issue, Length of Employment, Education Level 
Step 2’s predictors: Step 1’s predictors, Attitude and Subjective Norms 
Step 3’s predictors: Step 2’s predictors Perceived Control, Self-efficacy 
Step 4’s predictors: Step 3’s predictors, Accountability 
Step 5’s predictors: Step 4’s predictors, Attitude X Accountability, Subjective Norms X Accountability,  
          Perceived Control x Accountability, Self-efficacy X Accountability 
 
 
Moderating Influence of Authority’s Directive 
 
TABLE F3: Moderated Hierachical Regression Analysis Model (Electronic Monitoring) 
 
Step R R2 Adjusted 
R2 
S.E. of the 
Estimate 
'R2 'F df Sig. F '
1 .40 .16 .13 1.96 .16 6.13 3, 98 .00 
2 .84 .70 .69 1.18 .55 88.10 2, 96 .00 
3 .84 .71 .68 1.18 .00 .49 2, 94 .61 
4 .84 .71 .68 1.18 .00 .54 1, 93 .47 
5 .85 .72 .68 1.19 .01 .67 4, 89 .61 
Step 1’s predictors: (Constant), Recognition of Ethical Issue, Length of Employment, Education Level 
Step 2’s predictors: Step 1’s predictors, Attitude and Subjective Norms 
Step 3’s predictors: Step 2’s predictors Perceived Control, Self-efficacy 
Step 4’s predictors: Step 3’s predictors, Authority 
Step 5’s predictors: Step 4’s predictors, Attitude X Authority, Subjective Norms X Authority,  
         Perceived Control x Authority, Self-efficacy X Authority 
 
≅      p < 0.10  
*      p < 0.05  
**    p < 0.01     
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TABLE F4: Model 5’s t-statistics and β coefficients (Retrenchment) 
 




5 (Constant) 7.68 1.04  7.41 .00 
 Education -.17 .17 -.08 -1.00 .32 
 Length of Employment 0.00 .10 .00 .02 .99 
 Recognition of Ethical Issue -.15 .11 -.11 -1.40 .16 
 Attitude -0.01 .24 -.03 -.05 .96 
Subjective Norm .64 .56 .62 1.15 .26 
Perceived Control 2.36 .77 1.62 3.06 .00 
Self Efficacy -.61 .73 -.44 -.84 .41 
Moderator -.64 .26 -.18 -2.46 .02 
Attitude x Authority -0.05 .07 -.41 -.74 .46 
Subjective Norm x Authority -0.09 .16 -.32 -.59 .56 
Perceived Control x Authority -.68 .23 -1.58 -2.98 .00 
Self Efficacy x Authority .18 .22 .44 .82 .41 
≅      p < 0.10  
*      p < 0.05  





CODES: CHOICES, CONDITIONS & REASONS (ELECTRONIC MONITORING)
  
CHOICES MADE BY RESPONDENTS  
(where 1 = Strongly agree, 4 = Neither agree nor disagree, 7 = Strongly disagree).  
AGREE Respondents who rated 1, 2 or 3 on the scale for intentions  
DISAGREE Respondents who chose 5, 6 or 7 on the scale  
NEUTRAL Respondents who choose 4 on the scale 
   
CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH RESPONDENTS AGREES/DISAGREES TO USE ELECTRONIC
MONITORING ~ CON  
CON-EITHER Use either videotaping or phone-tapping 
CON-INFORM Inform employees about the use of electronic monitoring 
CON-LAST Use electronic monitoring as a secondary or last resort 
CON-SECRET Use electronic monitoring but do not let employees know 
  
REASONS FOR THE CHOICES MADE BY RESPONDENTS ~ RE 
HUMANE (RE-HU)  
RE-HU-DIGNITY 
1) Basic dignity or humanity for employees is expected                           
2) Employees should be treated like mature adults, fairly and with   
    respect 
RE-HU-NOT CONDUCIVE 
 
1) Electronic monitoring creates fear or insecurity at workplace              
2) Stifles working style, creativity or initiatives                                          
3) makes environment less conducive; unpleasant to have movements 
    scrutinized at all times                                                                         
4) restricts movements 
 
RE-HU-TRUST 
1) Electronic monitoring shows lack of trust in employees 
2) Creates mistrust                                                                                   
3) Should seek open & trusting dialogue                                                  
4) Trusting employees to do their job is very important 
RE-HU-WELFARE 
 
Employees' interest/welfare e.g. protect employees from customers'  
accusations 
  
MORAL (RE-MO)  
RE-MO-ETHICS An ethical issue; unethical to use electronic monitoring; harmful effects on employees 
RE-MO-HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Infringement or violation of human rights; privacy must be 
valued/advocated or not compromised 
 
RE-MO-PRIVACY Intrusive; invasion of employees' privacy; employees have rights to privacy 
  
PRAGMATIC (RE-PRG)  
RE-PRG-CHECK 
 
1) To keep employees alert                                                                      
2) Use as security surveillance or as deterrent                                        
3) Determine whether allegations against employees were true              
4) Gauge the seriousness of the situation 
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PRAGMATIC (RE-PRG) (continued from previous page) 
RE-PRG-EFFECTIVE 
 
1) Effective or solves problem quickly                                                      
2) Objective assessment of staff's work attitude and productivity            
3) Improvements can be made 
 
RE-PRG-INEFFECTIVE 
1) Ineffective, bad or negative practice                                                     
2) Will not improve situation or solve root cause of problem                    
3) Not worth using; method changes behavior but not attitude                
4) Work attitude and commitment has to be cultivated from the heart 
 
RE-PRG-MORALE Morale or work attitudes of the employees/observers  
RE-PRG-NEGATIVE 
 




1) Organization's interest (improves image, reputation, service quality, 
    productivity or customer satisfaction)                                                   
2) The system helps to identify poor performers so it can be used as a  
    training tool to help employees to perform more effectively                 
3) The decision sends the wrong messages about the organization. 
RE-PR-ORG RIGHT 
 
1) Organization has every right to use electronic monitoring                   
2) Employees who are dutiful need not fear monitoring                           
3) Organization's premise and equipment are solely for business  
    purposes                            
4) Employees are expected to serve organization's professionalism  
    and be productive; no room is allowed for personal matters  
RE-PRG-OTHERS 
 
1) Use selective electronic monitoring                                                      
2) For my own self-interest                                                                       




1) Resolve the issue through open communication/discussion with  
    staff        
2) Take an open approach                                                                       
3) Involve staff to identify problems and brainstorm solutions                  
4) Send a clear message to staff on the possibility of discipline for poor 
    customer service 
ALT-FEEDBACK Gather feedback from customers or internal staff on ways to improve 
service or to troubleshoot problem areas 
ALT-INCENTIVES Give monetary rewards; customer service awards as incentives 
ALT-OTHERS 
 
1) Make random spot checks                                                                   
2) Discipline employees, recruit new staff, step-up supervision               
3) Make employees wear nametags                                                         




1) Train or educate staff                                                                           
2) Re-look at training programs                                                                




CODES: CHOICES, CONDITIONS & REASONS (RETRENCHMENT) 
  
CHOICES MADE BY RESPONDENTS 
AGREE Respondents who rated 1, 2 or 3 on the scale for intentions  
DISAGREE Respondents who chose 5, 6 or 7 on the scale  
NEUTRAL Respondents who chose 4 on the scale 
  
CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH RESPONDENTS AGREES/DISAGREES TO RETRENCH ~ CON 
  
CON-COMPROMISE Retrench employees but increase/adjust the severance payments  
CON-PERFORMANCE 
 





1) if company's survival is dependent on the downsizing decision 
2) if the costs is a huge burden 
3) based on need, rather than on retirement age or on costs 
4) if the business environment is very bad 
5) if it is legal 
6) if it does not affect other employees' morale 
7) if it is according to company's policy 
  
REASONS FOR THE CHOICES MADE BY RESPONDENTS ~ RE 
  
HUMANE (RE-HU)  
RE-HU-ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
1) The organization has a social obligation to pay the retirement benefits 
2) The management should be accountable for their actions   
3) The organization should already have set aside a sum of money for the  
    retirement fund 
 
RE-HU-COMPASSION 1) Organization should show compassion, humanity or dignity for the staff  
2) It would be too difficult for the employees to find another job 
RE-HU-WELFARE 
 
1) For the employees' interest, welfare or  well-being  






Unethical to retrench employees; should honor agreement 
 
RE-MO-JUSTICE 
1) Previous contribution ought to be taken into account 
2) Employees should be compensated for loyalty/long service and due 
recognition should be given 
3) Reasonable compensation should be given to employees or employees 
deserve to get the retirement fund  
4) Should not shortchange, cheat, exploit or take advantage of the 
employees.  
5) Unfair to employees or decision is unjustified; employees are only a few 
months away from retirement 






PRAGMATIC (RE-PRG)  
RE-PRG-COST 
 
Cost should not be the only factor for retrenchment 
 
RE-PRG-ECONOMICS 
1) The decision helps to save costs 
2) Cost burden affects shareholder value 
3) Profitability is more important 
4) High salaries are a burden 
RE-PRG-EXPERIENCE 
 
Useful to keep the older staff so as to tap their experiences, skills and 
knowledge 
 
RE-PRG-LEGAL 1) Decision has legal implications  2) Decision should follow Labor Law 
RE-PRG-MORALE 
 
1) For the morale of the employees/observers  
2) Creates fear among remaining employees 
3) Should preserve the confidence & trust of the employees 
 
RE-PRG-OBEY 
1) Obey CEO’s direction  
2) Should align with company’s direction 
3) Depends on company’s policy 
RE-PRG-ORG 
 
1) Business survival 
2) Reputation at stake 
3) Bad public relations or sends wrong message about organization 
 
RE-PRG-OTHERS 
Retrench because  
1) the decision is effective/solves problem quickly 
2) it is difficult to retrain older workers or younger workers have more   
       potential and more productive 
 
Do not retrench because  
1) the organization can still capitalize on skills and experience of staff  
2) the decision will have negative effects in the long term  
3) retrenchment should not be based on age 
 
Retrench a few but not all the five employees 
 
RE-PRG-PERFORMANCE Retrenchment should be based on performance and skill sets. 
  
ALTERNATIVES (RE-ALT)   
ALT-COMPROMISE 
 
1) Propose for win-win or compromised decisions 
2) Provide partial compensation 




Early retirement with adjusted or full retirement fund 
 
ALT-OTHERS 
1) Shorter work week 
2) Retrenchment fund can be paid in stages/installments 
3) Alternate workdays 
4) Consult legal advice before making decision 
ALT-PAYCUT 
 




CHOICES MADE BY RESPONDENTS 
Choices Concerning the Use of 
Electronic Monitoring
Disagree to Use
n = 113 (61.1%)
Neutral to Use
n = 3 (1.6%)
Agree to Use
n = 69 (37.3%)
 
 
Choices Concerning Retrenchment 
Disagree to retrench
n = 122 (66.7%)
Neutral towards whether 
to retrench n = 17 (9.3%)
Agree to retrench








CONDITIONS UNDERLYING DECISIONS 
TO USE ELECTRONIC MONITORING 
 
 
The Conditions under which Respondents 
Agree to Use Electronic Monitoring
Either 
n = 1 (1.5%)
Secret
n = 1 (1.5%)
Inform
n = 10 (14.5%)
Last
n = 3 (4.3 %)
 
 
The Conditions Under which Respondents 
Disagree to Use Electronic Monitoring
Either 
n = 1 (0.9%)
Last
n = 2 (1.8 %)
Inform
n = 4 (3.5%)
 
Note: Under the category of neutral towards the use of electronic monitoring, only one 
person indicated that he or she would use electronic monitoring as a last resort. The 
chart is not shown on this page. 
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CONDITIONS UNDERLYING DECISIONS  
TO RETRENCH EMPLOYEES 
 
Conditions under which 
Respondents Agree to Retrench
Others
n = 2 (4.5%)
Survive
n = 1 (2.3%)
 
 
Conditions under which 
Respondents are neutral towards 
Retrenchment
Performance
n = 5 (29.4%)
Others
n = 2 (11.8%)
Survive
n = 4 (23.5%)
 
 
Conditions under which 
Respondents Disagree to Retrench 
Performance
n = 9 (7.4%)
Others
n = 3 (2.5%)
Survive




TABLE 1: Reasons provided by respondents (electronic monitoring) 
CHOICE REASONS REASONS (SUB-CODES) 
(RE-HU)  
HUMANE 
• RE-HU-WELFARE • n = 3 (4.3%) 
(RE-MO) 
MORAL 
• RE-MO-PRIVACY    
• RE-MO-ETHICS  
• n = 1 (1.4%) 





• RE-PRG-EFFECTIVE  
• RE-PRG-ORG  
• RE-PRG-ORG RIGHT 
• RE-PRG-OTHERS  
• n = 11 (15.9%) 
• n = 21 (30.4%) 
• n = 24 (34.8%) 
• n = 4 (5.8%) 











• RE-ALT-COMMUNICATE  
• RE-ALT-INCENTIVES  
• RE-ALT-OTHERS  
• n = 1 (1.4%) 
• n = 1 (1.4%) 
• n = 2 (2.8%) 
(RE-HU)  
HUMANE 
• RE-HU-NOT CONDUCIVE  • n = 1 (33.3%) 
(RE-PRG) 
PRAGMATIC 
• RE-PRG-NEGATIVE • n = 1 (33.3%) 
 
NEUTRAL 
n = 3 (1.6 %) 
(RE-ALT) 
ALTERNATIVES 
• RE-ALT-COMMUNICATE  
• RE-ALT-OTHERS  
• n = 1 (33.3%) 




• RE-HU-NOT CONDUCIVE 
• RE-HU-DIGNITY 
• RE-HU-TRUST  
• n = 5 (4.4%) 
• n = 5 (4.4%) 
• n = 23 (20.4%) 
(RE-MO) 
MORAL 
• RE-MO-ETHICS  
• RE-MO-HUMAN RIGHTS 
• RE-MO-PRIVACY 
• n = 11 (9.7%) 
• n = 3 (2.7%) 
• n = 36 (31.9%) 
(RE-PRG) 
PRAGMATIC 
• RE-PRG-INEFFECTIVE  
• RE-PRG-MORALE  
• RE-PRG-NEGATIVE 
• RE-PRG-ORG  
• RE-PRG-OTHERS  
• n = 19 (16.8%) 
• n = 8 (7.1%) 
• n = 6 (5.3%) 
• n = 3 (2.7%) 














• RE-ALT-COMMUNICATE  
• RE-ALT-FEEDBACK 
• RE-ALT-INCENTIVES  
• RE-ALT-OTHERS  
• RE-ALT-TRAIN  
• n = 9 (8.0%) 
• n = 4 (3.5%) 
• n = 4 (3.5%) 
• n = 34 (30.1%) 
• n = 15 (13.3%) 
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TABLE 2: Reasons provided by respondents (retrenchment) 




• RE-PRG-ECONOMICS  
• RE-PRG-OBEY  
• RE-PRG-ORG  
• RE-PRG-OTHERS  
• n = 21 (47.7%) 
• n = 4 (9.1%) 
• n = 15 (34.1%) 












• RE-ALT-EARLY RETIRE 
• RE-ALT-OTHERS 
• n = 1 (2.3%) 
• n = 1 (2.3%) 
• n = 1 (2.3%) 
(RE-HU)  
HUMANE 
• RE-HU-COMPASSION  
• RE-HU-WELFARE 
• n = 2 (11.8%) 





• n = 3 (17.6%) 





• RE-PRG-OBEY  
• RE-PRG-ORG 
• n = 2 (11.8%) 
• n = 1 (5.9%) 
• n = 1 (5.9%) 












• RE-ALT-COMPROMISE  
• RE-ALT-OTHERS 
• n = 1 (5.9%) 





• RE-HU-COMPASSION  
• RE-HU-WELFARE 
• n = 5 (4.1%) 
• n = 10 (8.2%) 





• n = 18 (14.8%) 





• RE-PRG-COST  
• RE-PRG-EXPERIENCE 
• RE-PRG-LEGAL  
• RE-PRG-MORALE  
• RE-PRG-ORG 
• RE-PRG-OTHERS  
• RE-PRG-PERFORMANCE 
• n = 6 (4.9%) 
• n = 4 (3.3%) 
• n = 3 (2.5%) 
• n = 22.(18.0%) 
• n = 20 (16.4%) 
• n = 8 (6.6%) 












• RE-ALT-EARLY RETIRE 
• RE-ALT-OTHERS 
• RE-ALT-PAYCUT 
• n = 3 (2.5%) 
• n = 5 (4.1%) 
• n = 11 (9.0%) 
• n = 5 (4.1%) 
 
